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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last ten years, representatives of domestic produ-
cers, trade associations, and unions filed approximately 800 
petitions with the U.S. Department of Commerce ("the Com-
merce Department") and the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission ("the Commission") alleging that their clients were 
materially injured by dumped 1 or subsidized imports. 2 Once 
a petition is filed, the Commerce Department begins the task 
of determining whether the imports are in fact being 
dumped or subsidized, and if so, to what extent. 3 The 
amount of dumping or the size of the subsidy expressed as a 
percentage of the price of the imported product is called the 
"dumping margin" or the "subsidy margin." If the imports 
are being dumped or are receiving a countervailable sub-
sidy,4 the Commission must determine whether the domestic 
industry, represented by the petitioners, has been thereby 
injured. 5 When the Commission makes its determination, 
they may not consider any benefits to consumers of the do-
mestic or imported products from lower prices.6 If both the 
Commerce Department and the Commission make affirma-
tive determinations, the United States Customs Service 
("Customs") will impose an antidumping or countervailing 
l. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
2. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT '88, at 36 (1989);j. 
Finger and T. Murray, Policing Unfair Imports: The United States Exam-
ple 2 n.l (Februrary 20, 1990) (there were 774 antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases from 1980 through 1988) (available in the author's file 
at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York Uni-
versity School of Law). 
3. 19 u.s.c. § 1671b(b) (1982). 
4. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
5. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167l(a)(2), 1673(2) (1982). 
6. See generally Applebaum & Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and Antidumping 
Actions Under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 
497, 508-09 (1987) (dumping does not have to have an anticompetitive 
impact); Sykes, "Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective," 89 
Columbia L. Rev. 199 (1989) (criticizing countervailing duty law for not 
promoting efficiency). 
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duty on the imports equal to the dumping or subsidy margin 
as calculated by the Commerce Department. 7 
These investigations are expensive for the parties and 
the federal government to litigate.8 The impact of the Com-
mission's decisions on domestic producers, foreign produ-
cers, importers, and consumers is far greater.9 Nevertheless, 
in spite of the large number of investigations and the sub-
stantial effects the Commission's determinations have 
around the world, the Commission lacks a consistent, analyt-
ically sound framework guiding its determinations. In this 
Article, I will propose and describe such a framework and 
argue that this framework is consistent with both the intent 
of Congress when it enacted the current law and United 
States international obligations. 10 In contrast to the pro-
posed framework, the framework traditionally used by the 
Commission is inconsistent with basic economic principles, 
Congressional intent and United States international obliga-
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167l(a), 1673 (1982). As a matter of terminology, 
countervailing duties apply to subsidized imports, and antidumping duties 
apply to dumped imports. 
8. See General Accounting Office, Pursuit of the Trade Law Remedies 
by Small Business 7-9 ( 1988) (the cost to petitioners of pursuing anti-
dumping cases generally ranges from $150,000 to $550,000 and is slightly 
less for a countervailing duty case); Rugman, U.S. Protectionism and Cana-
dian Trade Policy, 20 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 363, 368, 372 (1986); U.S. INT'L 
TRADE CoMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT '88, at 20 (1989) (the Commission's 1988 
budget was $34,750,000). 
9. See generally Elzinga, Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist's 
Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 439,442 (1987). An individual case can have 
a large impact. As a result of the Commission's decision in Antifriction 
Bearings (other than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singa-
pore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2185, Inv. 
Nos. 303-TA-19, -20 and 731-TA-391 through 399 (1989) (final), approxi-
mately $500 million in annual imports of antifriction bearings, widely used 
in the aircraft, automotive, and construction industries will face antidump-
ing and countervailing duties. BNA, Large Dumping Margins Found by 
IT A on Bearing Imports from 9 Countries, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. 393 (Mar. 
29, 1989). Because the average estimated duty exceeds 60 percent, the 
order will force importers to post cash deposits with Customs of around 
$300 million a year to cover anticipated duties. BNA, lTC Finds American 
Industry Materially Injured by Three Classes of Dumped Bearings, 6 INT'L 
TRADE REP. 553 (May 3, 1989). 
10. Previous drafts of this Article have been circulated within and with-
out the Commission and several commissioners use elements of the pro-
posed approach. 
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tions. 11 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: 
The next section provides a brief introduction into the eco-
nomics and the law of dumping and subsidies and describes 
the Commission's traditional approach to injury. The third 
section introduces the proposed framework, which I call the 
economic approach to injury. The fourth section provides a 
mathematical model of the economic approach and derives 
the relations that exist between the parameters of the model 
and the injury to the domestic industry from the unfair prac-
tice. The fifth section provides the legal argument in sup-
port of the economic approach. The sixth section contains a 
critical discussion of current Commission practice. The sev-
enth section contains a critical discussion of current Com-
merce Department practice. The eighth section is the con-
clusion. 
II. THE EcoNOMics AND THE LAw or DuMPING 
AND SUBSIDIES 
In 1979, during the Tokyo Round of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 12 the delegates 
adopted the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 1!' 
("Subsidies Code") and the Second Antidumping Duties 
II. The issue of whether the United States should have an antidump-
ing and countervailing duty law is beyond the scope of this Article. I will 
address a narrower question-how should the Commission administer the 
existing antidumping and countervailing duty law?-which is a question of 
statutory interpretation rather than economic policy. The Commission 
bears the duty to enforce the law as it was written by Congress. However, 
this does not preclude a role for economic analysis in administrative law. 
For one view of the role of economics in agency interpretation and admin-
istration of law, see Wald,judicial Review of Economic Analyses, I YALE J. ON 
REG. 43 (1983). 
12. The GATT is an agreement among approximately 100 nations that 
regulates aspects of international commerce. General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187. For a compilation of GATT documents, see GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED 
DocuMENTS (1947- ). For general discussions of the GATT, seeK. DAM, 
THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); J. 
jACKSON, WoRLD TRADE AND THE LAw oF THE GATT (1969). 
13. Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of 
GATT, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619. 
,I 
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Code14 ("Antidumping Code, and together with the Subsi-
dies Code, the "Codes"). 15 Later that year, in order to bring 
U.S. law into conformity with the Codes,16 Congress passed 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("1979 Act"), which re-
pealed the prior statutory scheme for antidumping and 
countervailing duties and added a new title to the Trade Act 
of 1930 ("1930 Act"). 17 This new title, Title VII, contains 
the current law for the imposition of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties. 1s 
A. The Definition of Dumping 
Title VII defines dumping as the sale in the United 
States of a class or kind of foreign merchandise at less than 
its fair value. 19 The Commerce Department considers the 
fair value of imported merchandise to be the foreign market 
value of merchandise that is the same as or similar to the 
merchandise that is exported to the United States.20 Same 
or similar merchandise is merchandise produced in the same 
country by the same person who is exporting to the United 
States and that is similar in material, purpose, and value to 
the merchandise exported to the United States. 21 In order 
to have a basis to compare prices, the Commerce Depart-
ment calculates all prices back to the factory door. Thus, the 
U.S. price is the ex-factory price of merchandise destined for 
14. Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the GATT, Apr. 12, 
1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650. 
15. These Codes are not a treaty, but form part of an international 
agreement that the United States has entered by executive agreement. 
The Codes are not controlling law in the United States. 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 2503,2504 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979); 
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 421. 
16. 19 u.s.c. § 2503 (1982). 
17. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 193 
(19---) (repealing Antidumping Duty Act of21, ch. 14,42 Stat. 11, amend-
ing Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 93 Stat. 151) (codified as amended at 19 
U.S.C. §§ I671-1677g (1982)). 
18. Sandler, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19 lNT'L LAw. 761, 
763-74 (1985), gives a good introduction to the antidumping and counter-
vailing duties laws. 
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
20. 19 C.F.R. § 353.42, .46 (1989). 
21. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(16) (1982). 
I 
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sale in the U.S. market.22 Similarly, the foreign-market value 
is usually the ex-factory price of merchandise destined for 
sale in the foreign producer's home market.23 Dumping, 
therefore, occurs when the ex-factory price of the merchan-
dise destined for sale in the United States is less than the ex-
factory price of the merchandise destined for sale in the 
home market. The practice of charging different prices to 
different customers for the same merchandise is called price 
discrimination. Consequently, dumping is a form of price 
discrimination between national markets, in which a higher 
price is charged at home than in the U.S. market.24 
Since dumping is a form of price discrimination, the 
same economic theory applies to both.25 Thus, a rational 
firm in long-run equilibrium will engage in dumping if the 
following three conditions exist: 
1) separate national markets prevent the 
reimportation of the lower-priced exports; 
2) the exporter has market power in its home 
market; and 
3) the exporter faces a more elastic demand 
curve in the United States than in its home mar-
ket.26 
Before a firm in long-run equilibrium will dump, all three 
conditions must be met. If any of the conditions is not met, 
the exporting firm will charge the same price in the U.S. mar-
ket that it charges at home. 27 
A rational firm might also temporarily engage in dump-
ing for a variety of reasons. For example, a rational firm 
might engage in dumping because it is a new entrant into the 
U.S. market and it is trying to build goodwill. Alternatively, 
a dumping firm might be engaging in predatory pricing, 
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41 
(1989). 
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(I)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.46(a) (1989). 
24. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3-9 
(1923). 
25. /d. at 3-4. 
26. Boltuck, An Economic Analysis of Dumping, 21 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 45, 
4 7 ( 1987); for a discussion of these conditions, see R. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING 
LAw IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 27 (1980). 
27. Boltuck, supra note 26, at 46-48. 
I I 
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charging a very low price in the United States in an attempt 
to drive its competitors out of the market, so it can later raise 
its price and earn monopoly profits. 2s 
Title VII covers two kinds of dumping, cost dumping 
and price dumping. The discussion of dumping so far has 
dealt with price dumping. Price dumping occurs when the 
home-market price of merchandise exceeds its U.S. market 
price. Cost dumping occurs when merchandise is sold in the 
United States below its full cost of production. 29 Cost 
dumping is likely to occur when demand is stochastic and 
there are substantial fixed costs of production. Under these 
conditions, when demand is strong, producers will operate at 
capacity and will charge prices high enough to cover their 
fixed costs of production. However, when demand is slug-
gish, producers will not operate at capacity and they will 
charge only enough to cover their variable costs of produc-
tion. Thus, when demand is sluggish, producers of products 
that require large fixed costs of production, such as steel, are 
likely to engage in dumping.3o 
As the discussion above shows, dumping can occur for a 
variety of reasons. However, the only explanation for persis-
tent dumping is price discrimination. Because the other 
forms of dumping are only temporary phenomena, price dis-
crimination is probably the explanation for most of the 
dumping that is observed.31 
B. The Definition of Subsidy 
A subsidy is simply a bounty or grant given by a govern-
ment. 32 Title VII divides subsidies into two broad classes: 
domestic subsidies and export subsidies. Domestic subsidies 
are subsidies that promote the production or sale of mer-
chandise that might or might not be exported. A domestic 
28. For a discussion of various explanations for short-run dumping, see 
J. VINER, supra note 24, at 23; W. WARES, THE THEORY oF DUMPING AND 
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 7-12 ( 1977). 
29. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(b) (1982). 
30. For a discussion of the economics of cost dumping, see Ethier, 
Dumping, 90 J. PoL. EcoN. 487 (1982). 
31. See G. VON HABERLER, THE THEORY oF INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH 
ITS APPLICATION TO CoMMERCIAL PoLICY 296-317 (1936); see also W. 
WARES, supra note 28, at I 0-12. 
32. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a)(l), 1677(5) (1982). 
-------..""'-.. 
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subsidy on goods exported to the United States is 
countervailable by the United States if the subsidy is avail-
able only to a specific enterprise or industry or group of en-
terprises or industries. A subsidy that is available to all en-
terprises or industries in a country, such as public roads and 
public schools, is considered to be generally available, and is 
therefore not countervailable.3 3 
Included in Title VII's sweep of countervailable domes-
tic subsidies are research and development subsidies, subsi-
dies to factors of production, equity infusions on non-com-
mercial terms, loan guaranties, and loans with below-market 
interest rates. 34 The Commerce Department values a sub-
sidy at the net amount that is received by the producer. 35 In 
calculating the net value of the subsidy, the Commerce De-
partment does not subtract any costs incurred by the recipi-
ent in order to be eligible for the subsidy. Thus, for exam-
ple, the cost to a foreign producer of moving its plant to an-
other region will not be considered in calculating the net 
subsidy. This cost will be excluded from the calculation even 
if the subsidy was conditioned on the producer relocating its 
plant and only covered the recipient's actual relocation ex-
penses.36 
In addition to domestic subsidies, Title VII also includes 
export subsidies within its list of countervailable subsidies. 37 
The defining characteristic of an export subsidy is that the 
subsidy gives preferential treatment to goods that are ex-
ported as opposed to goods that are sold in the exporter's 
home market. Export subsidies are countervailable regard-
33. See Non-Rubber Footwear from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 992 
(1984). 
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii). 
35. /d. §§ 1303(a)(1), 1677(6). The Commerce Department has re-
cently proposed new regulations codifying its methodology for determin-
ing whether subsidy exists, measuring its value, and allocating that value 
over time. 54 Fed. Reg. 23366 (May 31, 1989). 
36. Cf H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979); S. REP. 
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 381, 471. 
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982). The GAIT defines an export sub-
sidy as a subsidy, either direct or indirect, on exports. Protocol Amending 
the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Mar. 10, 1955, art. XVI, para. 4, 8 U.S.T. 1767, 1777, T.I.A.S. No. 
3930, at 11, 278 U.N.T.S. 168, 184. 
- - j 
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less of whether they are generally available or not in the 
country where they were given. 38 
The method used by the Commerce Department to 
measure a subsidy is the per unit value of the subsidy re-
ceived by the producer. This is not always equal to the per 
unit reduction in marginal cost. The per unit value of the 
subsidy received can be less than, greater than, or equal to 
the per unit reduction in the marginal cost of producing the 
good caused by subsidy. In graphic terms, the reduction in 
the cost of producing the good is depicted as a shift in the 
import supply curve.39 For example, if Lilliput provided Lil-
liputian widget manufacturers with a subsidy of $1 for each 
widget they produced, the subsidy would reduce the cost of 
producing each widget by $1 and shift the import supply 
curve by $1. Such a subsidy will be referred to as a full pass-
through subsidy because the per unit value of the subsidy 
and the per unit shift in the marginal cost curve are equal.40 
For many subsidies, however, less than the full amount 
of the subsidy will be passed through to the import supply 
curve. For example, assume that the Lilliputian government 
recently decided to subsidize widget production by provid-
ing widget manufacturers with a subsidy of $1 for each hour 
of labor used in the production of widgets. Assume further, 
before the subsidy was granted one half hour of labor was 
used along with 3.25 units of capital to produce one widget. 
The subsidy, by reducing the relative price of labor, caused 
widget producers to use labor more intensively and capital 
less intensively; one hour of labor is used along with 2 units 
of capital to produce one widget. Under these assumptions, 
the value of the subsidy received by the recipient, as calcu-
lated by the Commerce Department, will be $1 a widget. At 
the pre-subsidy level of labor usage, the subsidy would have 
reduced the cost of producing a widget by only $.50. The 
38. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982). 
39. The phrase "import supply curve" will be used to refer to a foreign 
producer's excess supply curve to the United States. From the perspective 
of the foreign producer, it is an export supply curve. From the perspective 
of the United States, it is an import supply curve. Either term could have 
been used; because the antidumping and countervailing duty law is con-
cerned with effects on U.S. markets, I will use the term which represents 
the U.S. perspective. 
40. See infra p. 59, diagram l. 
i 
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subsidy, however, by causing an increase in the intensity of 
labor also caused a decrease in the marginal productivity of 
labor, thereby leading to a reduction of between $.50 and $1 
in the cost of producing a widget as a result of the subsidy. 
For example, assume that the unsubsidized wage rate is 
$3.00 an hour and that the price of capital is $1.00 a unit. 
Before the subsidy went into effect producers used one half 
hour of labor, which cost $1.50, and 3.25 units of capital, 
which cost $3.25, to produce one widget at a total cost of 
$4.75. Producers did not use 1 hour of labor and 2 units of 
capital to produce a widget because it would have cost $5.00 
to produce a widget. If the producers had stayed with their 
original factor proportions after the subsidy became avail-
able, it would have cost $4.25 to produce a widget, thereby 
reducing the cost of production by $.50. However, by shift-
ing their factor proportions, producers were able to reduce 
the cost of production to $4.00, which is a saving of $.75 a 
widget over the initial cost ofproduction. This $.75 saving is 
the shift in the import supply curve because of the subsidy. 
The Commerce Department, however, calculates the subsidy 
to be $1.00 a widget because the cost of producing a widget 
using the post-subsidy factor proportions and pre-subsidy 
prices would be $1.00 more than the cost using the post-sub-
sidy factor proportions and the post-subsidy prices. 
Although the above example applies to only one special case, 
the principle, that a subsidy to a factor of production reduces 
the cost of production by an amount greater than the savings 
at the old factor proportions but less than the savings at the 
new factor proportions, is generally true.41 
The rest of this Article will focus primarily on full pass-
through subsidies, because, as is shown in Section VII, when 
the Commission uses the Commerce Department's calcula-
tions of the dumping and subsidy margins to estimate the 
effect the unfair practice had on the import supply curve, the 
proposed analysis will work exactly only for a subsidy that is 
41. For a discussion of this principle, see G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF 
PRICE ch. 7 (3d ed. 1966); see also Memorandum from Industry Economist, 
Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission, to Commis-
sioner Brunsdale, EC:J-225 (May 29, 1986) (available in the author's file at 
the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York Univer-
sity School of Law). 
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completely passed through to the import supply curve.42 
C. The Domestic Industry and the Determination of Injury 
In every investigation, the Commission begins its analy-
sis with the imported product that is allegedly either being 
dumped or benefitting from a subsidy.43 The Commission's 
first task is to define the like product: the product that "is 
like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics 
and uses with" the imported product.44 The like product de-
termination has proved troublesome for the Commission 
when the investigated product is part of a continuum of simi-
lar products.45 Essentially, the like product is the closest do-
mestically-produced substitute for the imported product.46 
The producers of the like product constitute the domestic 
industry.47 The Commission's injury determination is based 
on the domestic industry's production of the like product.48 
The statutory language of Title VII requires the Com-
mission to make a final determination of whether -
(A) an industry in the United States -
(i) is materially injured, or 
42. See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text. 
43. Although all dumping allegations go to the Commission, not all 
subsidy allegations go to the Commission. In general, only those coun-
tries that have signed the Subsidies Code or have adopted obligations sim-
ilar to those contained in the Subsidies Code are entitled to an injury test 
for subsidized imports. Subsidized imports from countries that are not 
entitled to an injury test are automatically countervailed if Commerce 
makes an affirmative determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982). 
44. /d. § 1677(10). 
45. See, e.g., Certain Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Japan, 
USITC Pub. 1224 lnv. No. 731-TA-87, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1871 (1982) 
(preliminary); see also Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United 
States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L LJ. 345, 392-99 (1985). 
46. The like product is generally limited to the closest substitute on the 
demand side. Substitutes on the supply side for the domestic like product 
are generally excluded. See Perry, supra note 44, at 393. For a recent criti-
cism of the Commission's definition of like product and industry as being 
too narrow and technical, see Note, Economically Meaningful Markets: AnAl-
ternative Approach to Defining 'Like Product' and 'Domestic Industry ' Under The 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 73 VA. L. REv. 1459 (1987). 
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987). 
48. There are a few instances in which the Commission can use a 
broader or narrower definition of industry to assess injury. See id. 
§ 1677(4)(B)-(D). 
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(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United 
States is materially retarded, by reason of imports, 
or sales (or the likelihood of sales) for importation, 
of the merchandise with respect to which the [Com-
merce Department] has made an affirmative deter-
• • 49 mmat10n .... 
49 
Material injury is present injury and is defined as "harm 
which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. " 50 
A threat of material injury is prospective injury. For a find-
ing that an industry is threatened with material injury, the 
threat must be real and the actual injury must be imminent 
and not based on mere conjecture.51 The third category of 
injury, material retardation, requires a finding by the Com-
mission that an industry did not develop in the United States 
by reason of the unfairly traded imports. 52 Material retarda-
tion is rarely an issue before the Commission. 
In making its determination, the statute directs the 
Commission to consider among other factors -
(i) the volume of imports of the merchandise 
which is the subject of the investigation, 
(ii) the effect of imports on that merchandise 
on prices in the United States for like products, and 
(iii) the impact of imports of such merchan-
dise on domestic producers of like products, but 
only in the context of production operations within 
the United States. 5S 
The statutory directions do not end here as the statute pro-
vides further elaboration on each of the three enumerated 
factors: 
(i) Volume.-In evaluating the volume of im-
49. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982). 
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). 
52. Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada, USITC Pub. 1711, Inv. 
No. 731-TA-199, at 4-5, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2353, 2355 (1985) (final). For a 
short, but thoughtful discussion of this case, see Palmeter, Material Retar-
dation in the Establishment of an Industry Standard in Antidumping Cases, 21 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 113 (1987). 
53. 19 U.S.C. § l677(7)(B) (1982), as amended by the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328, 102 Stat. 
1107 (1988) [hereinafter Trade Bill]. 
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ports of merchandise, the Commission shall con-
sider whether the volume of imports of the mer-
chandise, or any increase in that volume, either in 
absolute terms or relative to production or con-
sumption in the United States, is significant. 
(ii) Price.-In evaluating the effect of imports 
of such merchandise on prices, the Commission 
shall consider whether-
(1) there has been significant price under-
selling by the imported merchandise as com-
pared with the price of like products of the 
United States, and 
(II) the effect of imports of such mer-
chandise otherwise depresses prices to a signifi-
cant degree or prevents price increases, which 
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant 
degree. 
(iii) Impact on affected domestic industry.-
In examining the impact required to be considered 
under subparagraph (B)(iii), the Commission shall 
evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a 
bearing on the state of the industry in the United 
States, including, but not limited to-
(1) actual and potential decline in output, 
sales, market share, profits, productivity, return 
on investments, and utilization of capacity; 
(II) factors affecting domestic prices, 
(III) actual and potential negative effects 
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, 
growth, ability to raise capital, and investment, 
and 
(IV) actual and potential negative effects 
on the existing development and production 
efforts of the domestic industry, including ef-
forts to develop a derivative or more advanced 
version of the like product. 54 
Although Title VII provides the Commission with a list of 
factors to consider in its analysis, the statute does not pro-
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii) (1982), as amended by Trade Bill, supra 
note 53, § 1328. 
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vide a method by which such analysis should be conducted. 
Congress left that choice to the discretion of the Commis-
sion: "The determination of the lTC with respect to causa-
tion is ... complex and difficult, and is a matter for the judg-
ment of the lTC. "55 Thus the statute and the accompanying 
legislative history simply instruct the Commission to "con-
sider" and "evaluate" various factors. 5 6 
D. The Commissions Traditional Approach to the Determination 
of Injury 
Since the 1979 Act went into effect, fourteen commis-
sioners have served on the Commission and no two have had 
exactly the same interpretation of Title VII. Nevertheless, 
there are some common elements that run through a major-
ity of the commissioners' opinions. In the discussion that 
follows, I refer to these elements as "the traditional ap-
proach" to injury.57 
The traditional approach begins with the bifurcation of 
injury and causation. The Commission first determines 
whether the domestic industry is experiencing material in-
jury. Only if the Commission concludes that the domestic 
industry is in a state of material injury will the Commission 
consider whether dumped or subsidized imports are a cause 
55. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1979). 
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1982), as amended by Trade Bill, supra note 
53, § 1328; see Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Plates and Sheets from Argen-
tina, USITC Pub. 2089, Inv. No. 731-TA-175, at 31-35, lO I.T.R.D. (BNA) 
2142, 2154-56 (1988) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final, second remand); E. 
Easton, The Commission's Injury Investigations: Opportunities for More 
Effective Judicial Review 28 (Oct. 24, 1986) (presented at the Third An-
nual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade) (avail-
able in the author's file at the offices of the journal of International Law and 
Politics, New York University School of Law); DeGrandis, Proving Causation 
in Antidumping Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 563, 564 (1986). Some of the factors 
listed in the statute focus directly on the injury to the domestic industry 
whereas others may be used to help infer the injury. See 3.5 Inch 
Microdisks and Media Therefor from Japan, US lTC Pub. 2076, Inv. No. 
731-TA-389, at 71 (Apr. 1988) (Cass, Comm'r) (preliminary). 
57. A detailed description of the Commission and its antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations is given by Perry, supra note 45, at 378-
430. Excluded are former Commissioners Liebeler and Stern as well as 
the two current commissioners who use the economic approach: Commis-
sioner Brunsdale, who calls her version elasticity analysis, and Commis-
sioner Cass, who calls his version the comparative or unitary approach. 
--.1: ...... _____ _ 
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of that injury.58 The first test is referred to as the injury test 
and the second as the causation test. 59 According to the 
traditional approach, the Commission makes an affirmative 
determination only if there are both injury and causation. 
1. The Injury Test 
The traditional, bifurcated approach to the determina-
tion of injury begins with a discussion of the condition of the 
domestic industry. The Commission assesses this by looking 
at the industry as it is today, and then comparing the current 
state of the industry to the state of the industry several years 
before the petition was filed. In examining the current state 
of the industry, the Commission looks to see if the firms are 
unprofitable or if profit levels are low, and it looks to see if 
firms are either leaving the industry or closing plants. Any of 
these conditions is considered to be evidence of material in-
jury.60 
The Commission also compares the conditions in the in-
dustry today with that of three years ago. If employment, 
production, prices, capacity, and returns on equity and assets 
today are below their levels three years ago, this will also be 
considered evidence of material injury.61 Under the tradi-
58. See Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate from Taiwan, USITC 
Pub. 2032, Inv. No. 731-TA-371, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1469 (1987) (final) 
(negative determination based on independent grounds of no injury and 
no causation). Compare Portland Hydraulic Cement from Columbia, 
France, Greece, USITC Pub. 1925, lnv. Nos. 731-TA-356 to -363, 9 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1663 (1986) (preliminary) (negative determination based 
on finding that domestic industry not experiencing injury without address- ' 
ing causation issue) with Hydrogenated Castor Oil from Brazil, USITC 
Pub. 1804, Inv. No. 731-TA-236, at 3, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1565, 1568-69 
( 1986) (final) (negative determination based on finding that L TFV imports 
were not a cause of material injury domestic industry was experiencing). 
59. Also, the Commission's determination, as opposed to the Com-
merce Department's determination, is sometimes called the injury test. 
The definition of the injury test encompasses both the narrower definition 
of the injury test and the causation test. 
60. Compare Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereof 
fromjapan, USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207, at 12-14, 8 I.T.R.D. 
(BNA) 1223, 1228-29 (1985) (final) (injury), with Portland Hydraulic Ce-
ment from Columbia, France, Greece, USITC Pub. 1925, Inv. Nos. 731-
TA-356 to -363, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1663 (1986) (preliminary) (no injury). 
61. Compare Internal Combustion Forklift Trucks from Japan, USITC 
Pub. 2082, Inv. No. 731-TA-377, at 20-23, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1947, 1954-
1989] AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 53 
tional bifurcated approach, the Commission will either de-
termine that the domestic industry is experiencing material 
injury and then proceed to consider whether the unfair im-
ports are a cause of that injury; or it will determine that the 
domestic industry is neither experiencing material injury nor 
is threatened with material injury and will terminate its inves-
tigation. 
2. The Causation Test 
The second prong of the traditional bifurcated approach 
is the causation test. The traditional approach to causation 
does not include an examination of the effects of the unfair 
practice, but instead an examination of the effects of the im-
ports.62 In assessing causation, the Commission includes all 
imports from the countries under investigation, except im-
ports of the product from companies for which the Com-
merce Department has made a negative determination. The 
Commission includes all imports from these companies and 
not just those imports that the Commerce Department has 
55 (1988) (final) (injury), with Certain Bimetalic Cylinders from Japan, 
USITC Pub. 2080, lnv. No. 731-TA-383, at 17-19, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 
2038, 2044-45 (1988) (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, Comm'rs) (final) (no in-
jury). 
62. Four of the six current and eight most recent commissioners have 
looked at the effects of all of the unfairly traded imports to assess causa-
tion. Compare Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, USITC Pub. 
1966, Inv. No. 701-TA-281, at 13-15 (Apr. 1987) (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, 
Comm'rs) (final) (considering effects of imports), with Digital Readout Sys-
tems and Subassemblies Thereof from Japan, USITC Pub. 2081, Inv. No. 
731-TA-390, at 23-25 (May 1988) (Liebeler, Chairman, Brunsdale, V. 
Chairman, & Cass, Comm'r) (preliminary) (considering effects of unfair 
practice) and Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and 
Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 13-14, 8 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1779, 1781 (1986) (Stern, Chairwoman, Liebeler, V. 
Chairman, & Brunsdale, Comm'r) (final) (considering effects of unfair 
practice). The CIT has recently held that the Commission can, but need 
not, consider the size of the unfair practice. Copperweld Corp. v. United 
States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 558-64 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Hyundai Pipe Co. 
v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 670 F. Supp. 357, 360 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1987). Previously, the CIT rejected claims that the Commission 
must consider the size of the unfair practice. Maine Potato Council v. 
United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (dumped 
imports); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640,646 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1984) (subsidized imports) (dicta). 
I' 
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found to be dumped or subsidized.63 Moreover, those com-
missioners who use the traditional approach will conclude 
that the causation element of the bifurcated test is met if they 
find that the imports have contributed to the condition of the 
domestic industry.64 Furthermore, the traditional approach 
emphasizes three factors in determining whether the imports 
have made any contribution to the condition of the domestic 
industry: underselling, lost sales, and import trends. 
a. Underselling 
The Commission looks for underselling by comparing 
the price of the imported article in the U.S. market with the 
price of the like product, which is usually the closest domes-
tic substitute. Underselling occurs when the average price of 
the imported article in the U.S. market is below the average 
price of the competing domestic article in the U.S. market.65 
If the domestic article is more expensive than the imported 
article, there is overselling. Underselling is considered to be 
evidence of causation; overselling is considered to be evi-
dence against causation.66 
63. See Memorandum from the General Counsel, U.S. Intemational 
Trade Commission, GC-J-016, at 4 (Jan. 27, 1986) (LEXIS, I Trade Li-
brary, GCM file). 
64. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, USITC Pub. 1844, 
Inv. No. 701-TA-257, at 14-15, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2577, 2582-83 (1986) 
(final) (three-to-three affirmative on whole fish); see British Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 593 F. Supp. 405, 413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
65. Underselling and dumping are different but related concepts. Un-
derselling 'involves a comparison of the price of the imported article to the 
price of the like product in the United States. Dumping involves a com-
parison of the price of the imported article in the United States to the 
price of such or similar merchandise at home. 
66. Compare Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from Ko-
rea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267, -268 and 731-
TA-304, -305, at 13,9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1768, 1772-73 (1987) (Brunsdale, 
V. Chairman) (final) (causation because in part Korean and Taiwanese 
cooking ware undersold domestic cooking ware), with Certain Table Wine 
from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy, USITC Pub. 
1771, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-258 to -260 and 731-TA-283 to -285, at 18-23, 7 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2645, 2646 (1985) (preliminary) (no. causation because do-
mestic table wine undersold table wine imported from the countries under 
investigation). See Perry, supra note 45, at 408 (in almost every case in 
which the Commission has made an affirmative determination the im-
ported product has undersold the domestic product). 
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b. Lost Sales 
Lost sales are sales that domestic producers have alleg-
edly lost to unfairly traded imports. According to the Com-
mission, a lost sale occurs when a U.S. consumer purchased 
the imported product instead of the domestic product be-
cause the imported product was cheaper than the domestic 
product.67 To search for lost sales, the Commission asks the 
petitioners to provide a list of purchasers from whom they 
have allegedly lost sales to unfairly traded imports. The 
Commission then has a staff member call these purchasers to 
ask them which producers' merchandise they bought. If a 
purchaser bought merchandise produced by any of the pro-
ducers under investigation, the Commission staff member 
will ask the purchaser whether the domestic like product was 
available when it bought the imported product and the rea-
son for the purchase of the imported product. If the pur-
chaser bought the imported product, acknowledges the 
availability of the like product, and lists as one of the reasons 
for its purchase of the imported product that it was cheaper 
than the like product or says that price was an important con-
sideration in making its purchase decision, the Commission 
will consider this a lost sale. The presence of lost sales is 
considered to be evidence of causation; their absence is con-
sidered to be evidence against causation.68 
c. Import Trends 
The third factor that the Commission traditionally ex-
amines is impon trends. When the quantity and market pen-
67. See Memorandum from the General Counsel, U.S. International 
Trade Commission, GC-H-029, at 7 (Jan. 30, 1984), (LEXIS, I Trade Li-
brary, GCM file), cited in Jameson, Recent International Trade Commission Prac-
tice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique, 18 L. & PoL'Y INT'L 
Bus. 517, 532 n.63 (1986). 
68. Compare Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate from Taiwan, 
USITC Pub. 2032, lnv. No. 731-TA-371, at 12, lO I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1470 
(final) (negative because, among other reasons, virtually no lost sales alle-
gations were confirmed by the Commission and volume of confirmed lost 
sales was quite small), with Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies 
Thereoffromjapan, USITC Pub. 1786, lnv. No. 731-TA-207, at 788-89,8 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1230-31 (final) (affirmative because, among other rea-
sons, there was a significant number of lost sales). See DeGrandis, supra 
note 56, at 566-67. 
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etration of imports from the countries under investigation 
are increasing, the Commission is likely to find a causal con-
nection between the unfairly-traded imports and the condi-
tion of the industry.69 The Commission will also look for a 
negative correlation between the market penetration of the 
imports and either the market penetration of the domestic 
product or the profitability of the domestic industry. The 
existence of such a negative correlation is considered evi-
dence of causation, and the absence of a negative correlation 
is considered evidence against causation. 7o 
III. THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO INJURY BY REASON OF 
DUMPED AND SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS 
As will be shown in Section VI, the problem with the 
Commission's traditional analysis of causation is that it is 
premised on economically unsound assumptions about how 
dumped and subsidized imports affect competing domestic 
industries. Consequently, to provide a better framework 
with which to measure injury, one must understand how an 
unfair trade practice affects the competing domestic indus-
try. The first part of this section describes how a subsidy to 
an imported product will affect domestic producers of a com-
69. Compare Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from Ko-
rea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267, -268 and 731-
TA-304 & -305, at 11-12, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1772 (final) (causal connec-
tion), with Iron Ore Pellets from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1880, Inv. No. 701-
TA-235, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1115 (1986) (final) (no causal connection). The 
Commission also considers the market share held by the unfairly traded 
imports. In general, a finding of a causal connection is more likely when 
the imports hold a substantial share of the market. Compare Certain Brass 
Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, lnv. 
Nos. 701-TA-269 and 731-TA-311, -312, -315, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1701 
(1986) (final) (causal connection), with Fabric and Expanded Neoprene 
Laminate from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2032, Inv. No. 731-TA-371, at 11, 10 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1473 (1987) (final) (no causal connection). 
70. See, e.g., Certain Acetylsalicylic Acid from Turkey, USITC Pub. 
1926, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-238 and 731-TA-364 (1986) (preliminary); Oil 
Country Tubular Goods from Canada and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1865, Inv. 
Nos. 701-TA-255 and 731-TA-276, -277, at 10-11, 91.T.R.D. (BNA) 1051, 
1054-55 (1986) (final); cases cited in Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, 
USITC Pub. 1818;Inv. Nos. 701-TA-239 and 731-TA-248, at 30 n.l9, 8 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1935, at 1947 n.19 (1986) (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (fi-
nal); see also DeGrandis, supra note 56, at 566-67. 
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peting product and the second part introduces the economic . 
approach to injury. 
A. The Effects of a Subsidy on Competing Domestic Producers 
The effects of an unfair practice on the competing do-
mestic industry can be illustrated most simply with a subsidy 
that shifts the import supply curve by the full amount of the 
subsidy. To put the argument in terms of basic supply-and-
demand curve analysis, consider a subsidy on Lilliputian wid-
gets. If there are no U.S. widget producers, but some U.S. 
firms manufacture gidgets, which are very close substitutes 
for widgets, gidgets would be the like product and the U.S. 
gidget producers would be the domestic industry. To sim-
plify the discussion, it will be assumed that the U.S. gidget 
and Lilliputian widget industries are each made up of many 
competing producers and that gidgets and widgets are pro-
duced only in the United States and Lilliput but consumed 
only in the United States. The law of demand implies that 
the U.S. demand for gidgets is a decreasing function of the 
price of gidgets. Since widgets are a substitute for gidgets, 
the U.S. demand for gidgets is also an increasing function of 
the price of widgets. Similarly, the U.S. demand for widgets 
is a decreasing function of the price of widgets and an in-
creasing function of the price of gidgets. Equilibrium in the 
U.S. gidget and widget markets exists when the prices and 
quantities of gidgets and widgets are such that supply and 
demand are equal in both markets. 
Assume that Lilliput has not subsidized widgets in the 
past and that Lilliput has just introduced a subsidy on all 
widgets exported to the United States. The subsidy will re-
duce the cost to Lilliputian widget producers of making wid-
gets for the U.S. market. At any given price for widgets in 
the U.S. market, the subsidy will cause an increase in the 
number of widgets exported to the United States. At the old 
unsubsidized price for widgets in the United States, there 
will be an influx of widgets as Lilliputian widget producers 
increase production to take advantage of the subsidy. For 
importers of widgets to sell their increased stocks, the price 
of widgets in the United States will have to fall. Since wid .. 
gets and gidgets are substitutes, the demand for gidgets will 
decline as the price of widgets drops. As a result of the drop 
in the demand for gidgets, the price of gidgets will drop and 
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the production of gidgets will contract. In addition to falling 
prices and production, U.S. gidget producers will experience 
increased excess capacity, decreased revenues and reduced 
profits. Workers in the gidget industry will also be affected 
by the subsidy on Lilliputian widgets, as their hours and 
numbers decline. These consequences, which all flow di-
rectly from the subsidy, are precisely the kinds of effects that 
Congress sought to alleviate when it enacted Title VII. 
As the above discussion illustrates, there is a direct ef-
fect on a competing domestic industry from a subsidy. A 
subsidy shifts out the import supply curve, which in turn 
shifts in the demand curve facing the import-competing do-
mestic producers. The net effect of these shifts is to reduce 
domestic output, prices, revenue, profits, investment, capac-
ity utilization, and employment in the affected industry. This 
effect is illustrated in diagram 1 for the hypothetical subsidy 
on Lilliputian widgets. In diagram 1, the subscripts W and G 
are used to denote widgets and gidgets and the superscripts 
0 and 1 are used to denote the world without and with the 
subsidy. D denotes a demand curve, S a supply curve, P a 
price, and Qa quantity. 
In terms of diagram 1, the initial equilibrium in the U.S. 
widget market before the subsidy is available is given by the 
intersection of the demand curve Dw0 and the supply curve 
Sw 0• This produces an equilibrium price for widgets that are 
sold in the United States of Pw0 and an equilibrium output of 
<l>v0 • In the gidget market, the initial equilibrium before the 
subsidy is available is given by the intersection of the de-
mand curve De 0 and the supply curve Se, which yields an 
equilibrium price for gidgets of Pe0 and an equilibrium out-
put for gidgets of Q:t Equilibrium in the gidget and widget 
markets is determined simultaneously and the interaction 
between the two markets is through the demand curves for 
gidgets and widgets. Thus, the demand curve De 0 is the de-
mand curve for gidgets, assuming that the price of widgets is 
Pw0 , and the demand curve Dw0 is the demand curve for wid-
gets, assuming that the price of gidgets is P c 0 • Because 
gidgets and widgets are substitutes, the demand curve for 
gidgets is shifted down and to the left as the price of widgets 
declines. 
The subsidy to widgets will·shift the widget supply curve 
down by the amount of the subsidy that is passed through to 
59 
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DIAGRAM 1 
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sidy is available, intersect at price Pw' and output Qw'. This 
decline in the price of widgets, however, will disturb the 
equilibrium in the gidget market because the demand curve 
Dc0 only exists when the price of widgets is Pw0• Because the 
price of widgets, Pw', is below Pw0 , the demand curve for 
gidgets is shifted in. Because the gidget demand curve and 
Sc intersect at a price below P G 0 and because the demand 
curve Dw0 only exists if the price of gidgets is Pc0, the de-
mand curve for widgets is also shifted down, which causes a 
further shift in the demand for gid~ets. The new equilibrium 
exists with the demand curves Dw and Dc1• Thus, the sub-
sidy to widgets affects the gidget market by causing a down-
ward shift in the demand curve for gidgets. Conse~uently, 
the subsidy results in a lower price for gidgets, Pc is less 
than Pc0, and a reduction in the output of gidgets, Qp1 is less 
than Qp0 • 
Diagram 1 can also be used to illustrate the full effect of 
the importation of widgets on the market for gidgets. The 
full effect ofwidgets on the U.S. market for gidgets is not the 
same as the effect of the subsidy to widgets on the U.S. mar-
ket for gidgets. The full effect of the imports is given by how 
much better off the gidget industry would be if no widgets 
were sold in the United States. In order to assess the full 
effect of the imports, the state of the gidget industry with an 
embargo on widgets, superscript 2, must be compared to the 
current state of· the industry. The demand curve for gidgets 
when there are no widgets for sale, Dc2, is to the right of the 
initial demand curve for gidgets before the subsidy is avail-
able. Therefore, the price, Pc2, and quantity, Qp2, of gidgets 
are higher when widgets are excluded from the U.S. market 
than when widgets are sold in the United States but are not 
subsidized. Consequently, the reduction in the price and the 
quantity of gidgets caused by the importation of subsidized 
widgets will exceed the reduction in price and quantity 
caused solely by the subsidy to widgets. 
B. The Economic Approach to Injury 
The above discussion of how a subsidy affects domestic 
producers of a competing product suggests a simple frame-
work for determining whether a domestic industry is materi-
ally injured by a subsidy. Compare the condition of the do-
mestic industry today, faced with competing import subsi-
-----------~ 
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dies, to the condition that the domestic industry would be in 
today if the foreign producers had not been given the sub-
sidy. If the differences in such indicia of the state of the in-
dustry as domestic output, prices, revenue, profits, invest-
ment, capacity utilization, and employment are substantial, 
the import-competing domestic industry has been materially 
injured by the subsidy; if these differences are not substan-
tial, the industry has not been so injured. 7 1 
Three related aspects of this test differ from the tradi-
tional practice of the Commission. 72 First, under the eco-
nomic approach, the irtiury determination is made using a 
counterfactual starting point. The actual condition of the in-
dustry is compared with the condition the industry would be 
in if the subsidy had not been given to the foreign producers. 
Since the second half of the comparison is not directly ob-
servable, it can only be estimated. Second, there is no tem-
poral dimension to the test. The comparison is at a point in 
time. It is irrelevant whether the industry is doing better or 
worse today than it was doing yesterday.73 Third, the actual 
condition of the industry is irrelevant to the determination. 
All that matters is how much better the import-competing 
domestic industry would have done if the imports were not 
subsidized. Thus, under the economic approach, profitable 
industries as well as unprofitable industries can be injured by 
reason of subsidized imports. 
Two additional aspects of this proposed test, although 
71. The proposed appoach also applies to the threat-of-material-injury 
and material-retardation standards. A domestic industry is threatened 
with material injury if the condition of the domestic industry at some fu-
ture date would be improved materially by preventing the subsidy or 
dumping from occurring. The Commission interprets material retarda-
tion to mean that an undeveloped domestic industry would otherwise have 
developed. Thus, the economic approach to causation would require find-
ing a domestic industry that did not develop would have developed if the 
subsidy had not been granted or if the dumping did not occur. The ap-
proach also applies to antidumping investigations: compare the current 
condition of the industry to the condition the industry would be in but for 
the dumping. 
72. See supra section II.D. 
73. Over a period of time one also could make a comparison in which 
the state the industry was in during the period would be compared with 
the state the industry would have been in during the same period had the 
foreign producer not been given a subsidy. The key is that the same pe-
riod of time be on both sides of the comparison. 
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not as readily apparent, are important to its implementation. 
First, in applying the proposed test, the magnitude of the 
statutorily recognized injury is important. 74 In general, the 
unfair practice will have an adverse impact on the competing 
domestic industry. A subsidy that causes a shift in the import 
supply curve will have no effect on the competing domestic 
industry only when there is an infinitely elastic supply from 
third countries of a product that is a perfect substitute for 
the subsidized good. Thus, in only one set of conditions will 
a subsidy that causes a shift in the import supply curve have 
no effect on the prices received or quantities sold by U.S. 
producers of competing products. Consequently, if material 
becomes synonymous with de minimis,15 there will be no in-
jury test because in only one ideal case will the unfair prac-
tice have no effect at all. 76 In every other instance the unfair 
practice has some effect, if only a small one.77 
Second, in making its injury determination under Title 
74. The material injury standard is a low standard. The statute defines 
material injury to mean "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, 
or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982). 
75. Congress rejected the term ''de minimis" because of its long and 
contentious history under the antidumping law. H. Rep. No. 317, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979). 
76. The Court of International Trade has stated that the imports need 
contribute only minimally to the condition of the domestic industry. Brit-
ish Steel Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 405, 413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1984). Such a pronouncement comes close to reading the injury test out 
of the law. 
77. This argument is perhaps overstated. Any increase in supply from 
one foreign country will adversely affect domestic producers unless the 
increase in supply is offset exactly by a decrease in supply from other for-
eign countries, which will only occur in one ideal case. However, not all 
dumping and subsidization increases foreign supply. For example, a sub-
sidy to producers to relocate a plant can decrease supply by increasing 
transportation costs. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The Meaning of 'Sub-
sidy' and 'Injury' in the Countervailing Duty Law, 6 lNT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 1 7, 
22 ( 1986). Consequently, a de minimis standard for injury could be used 
without reading the injury test completely out of the law if the Commis-
sion viewed its task to be determining whether the unfair practice has 
caused an increase in exports to the United States. Such an analysis, how-
ever, would require the Commission to examine only the foreign industry 
and would leave it no reason to examine the domestic industry or market, 
because any increase in foreign supply would be sufficient to injure the 
domestic industry materially. Furthermore, if the Commission treats the 
· imports, and not the unfair practice, as the causal factor, the injury test is 
read out of the law when a de minimis standard is used, because except for 
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VII, it would be impossible for the Commission to compare 
every aspect of the condition of the industry as it currently is 
with what it would be had the subsidy not been granted. In 
addition, for the Commission even to develop both a finely 
detailed and highly accurate model of the industry_ and a de-
tailed knowledge of the industry's current conditions would 
be very time-consuming and expensive, and it probably 
would not significantly improve the application of the ap-
proach. Consequently, in making its statutory determina-
tion, the Commission should concentrate on both the de-
cline in the price of the like product and the reduction in the 
output of the like product brought about by the unfair prac-
tice. The proposed approach will be practicable by empha-
sizing only these two factors. Moreover, the statute directs 
the Commission to consider both the reduction in price and 
the reduction in output caused by the unfair practice. 78 Most 
important, the impact of the subsidy on the other factors that 
the statute directs the Commission to consider, such as the 
effects on employment, capacity, and profits, will generally 
be directly related to the impact of the subsidy on these two 
factors. 79 By concentrating on the decline in price and out-
put, the Commission can carry out the intent of Congress in 
an efficient and practical manner. 
IV. MODEL OF PROPOSED APPROACH TO INJURY 
DETERMINATION 
The previous section suggested a framework for the 
Commission to use to make its injury determination under 
one ideal case the domestic industry would always be better if the imports 
were excluded from the U.S. market. 
78. See 19 U.S.C. § l677(7)(B), (C) (1982). Wood suggests that the 
Commission make an affirmative determination only when the unfair trade 
practice drives the price of the domestic product below the competitive 
price. Wood, "'Unfair' Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach," 
41 Stan. L. Rev. 1153 , 1189 (1989). 
79. An unfair trade practice affects the competing domestic through its 
impact on the price and output of the like product. Accordingly, if the 
negative impact of the unfair practice on other factors is in general 
greater, the greater is the impact of the unfair practice on the price and 
output of the like product. However, when there is a reason to believe 
that the impact of the unfair practice on the other indicia relates differently 
to the impact on price and output, the Commission can inquire directly 
and more fully into these effects. 
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Title VII. Under the proposed approach, an industry is ma-
terially injured by reason of subsidized imports if it is materi-
ally worse off due to the unfair trade practice. In this sec-
tion, a mathematical model of the economic approach to in-
jury is developed and is then used to examine the effect of a 
subsidy on a competing U.S. industry. Additionally, the 
mathematical relations that exist between the parameters of 
the model and the injury to the domestic industry from an 
unfair practice of a given magnitude are derived. To facili-
tate the exposition, the example of a su~sidy on Lilliputian 
widgets that was used in the previous section is used again. 
This section also describes the mathematical model for 
the injury caused by a subsidy and how the mathematical re-
lations that are derived from that model can be used. The 
formal mathematical model can be used by the Commission 
and the public to arrive at rough estimates of the impact of 
the subsidy on the price and output of the like product. The 
Commission can then use the estimates and economic rela-
tions derived from the model to make its statutory determi- · 
nation.80 The public can also use these estimates and rela-
tions to assess the likely outcome of a Commission investiga-
tion. 
A. The Mathematical Model 
To simplify the development of the mathematical model 
·of injury, transportation costs, customs duties, middlemen's 
profits, retailers' profits, and other expenses that usually 
drive a wedge between the price received by the producer 
ctnd the price paid by the consumer for the same product will 
be ignored. Consequently, because of the subsidy, Lillipu-
tian widget producers will be paid more by U.S. consumers 
and the Lilliputian government together for each widget that 
they produce than U.S. consumers alone will pay for each 
widget that they buy. Assuming that the Lilliputian govern-
ment is providing a subsidy of v percent for each widget that 
80. See, e.g., Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from Brazil, USITC Pub. 
2038, Inv. No. 701-TA-282, at 13-18 (Nov. 1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chair-
,man) (final); Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 1733, Inv. 
No. 701-TA-224, at 13, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2285, 2291 (1985) (final) (esti-
mating decline in live swine prices attributable to increase in Canadian 
market share). 
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Lilliputian producers export to the United States, which sub-
sidy is fully passed through to the import supply curve, the 
ratio of the total price that Lilliputian producers are paid to 
the price that U.S. consumers pay for each widget is 1 +v. 
Thus, denoting by Pw the price of a widget in the United 
States, then Pw(l +v) is the price that Lilliputian producers 
are paid for each widget they export to the United States. 
The following notation will also be used throughout this 
example. Let PG be the price of gidgets in the United States, 
Qp the quantity of gidgets sold in the United States, and Q.w 
the quantity of widgets sold in the United States. Thus, the 
U.S. demand for gidgets can be written as 
(1) G(PG,Pw)=Qp. 
Denoting the derivatives of the function G with respect to PG 
and Pw by G 1 and G2, the law of demand implies that G 1 < 0. 
In addition, because gidgets and widgets are substitutes, 
G2 >0. Similarly, the U.S. demand for widgets can be written 
as 
(2) W(PG,Pw)=Q.w, 
with W 1>0 and W2 <0. 
The supply side of the U.S. market for widgets and 
gidgets is modeled as follows. Assuming that U.S. producers 
are willing to sell more gidgets the higher the price of 
gidgets, the supply curve for gidgets can be written as 
(3) s(PG) =Qc, 
with s'>O, where the prime indicates the derivative of the 
function. Similarly, the Lilliputian inverse supply curve for 
widgets exported to the United States can be written as 
(4) t(Pw(1 +v))=Q.w, 
with t'>O. Equations (1) through (4) describe the U.S. mar-
ket for widgets and gidgets with an export subsidy of v per-
cent on widgets. The model is complete in the sense that if 
the four functions are specified, the values of the four 
unknowns, PG, Pw, Qp and Q.w, can be found. Theoretically, 
the injury determination can be made by comparing the 
price (Pd and quantity (Qp) of gidgets in the U.S. market, 
characterized by equations (1) through (4) with v=O, to the 
price and quantity of gidgets in the U.S. market, character-
ized by equations (1) through (4) with v equal to the actual 
subsidy. 
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1. The Injury Measures 
To formalize the proposed approach to causation fur-
ther, I suggest using two measures of injury: the relative de-
cline in the price of the domestic like product caused by the 
subsidy (I) and the relative decline in the output of the do-
mestic like product caused by the subsidy (J). As applied 
here, these two measures are the relative declines in the 
price and quantity of gidgets sold in the U.S. market that are 
caused by the subsidy to widgets. Using the notation that the 
superscripts 0 and 1 denote the world without and with the 
subsidy, the two measures are written as follows: 
Pc0 - Pc1 
(5) I= 
pGO 
and 
Qvo- Qv' 
(6) ]= 
Qvo 
Because the subsidy reduces both the price and the output of 
gidgets, the measures I and] are both between zero and one. 
In addition, the higher the values of I and J, the larger the 
declines in the price and output of gidgets caused by the sub-
sidy to widgets. Thus, with all other things being equal, the 
higher the values of I and J, the larger is the injury from the 
subsidy and the more likely it is that the subsidy has materi-
ally injured the domestic industry. 
2. Constant Elasticity Demand and Supply Curves 
In order to derive explicit mathematical formulae for the. 
injury measures, some limitations are placed on the demand 
and supply curves. Gidge~s and widgets are assumed to be 
imperfect substitutes and to have the following industry-
wide, constant-elasticity demand equations: 
(7) Qv = APc -apwb 
and 
(8) Qw = BPccPw -d. 
The constants A, B, a, b, c, and d are all positive. The first 
two constants (A, B) are scale parameters. The last four con-
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stants are the own-price elasticity of demand for gidgets (a), 
the cross elasticity of demand for gidgets with respect to the 
price of widgets (b), the cross elasticity of demand for wid-
gets with respect to the price of gidgets (c), and the own-
price elasticity of demand for widgets (d). The supply equa-
tions for gidgets and widgets, assumed to be of constant 
elasticity and upward sloping, can be written as: 
(9) ~ = CPce 
and 
(10) Qw = DPwr(l +v)r. 
The constants C, D, e and f are all positive. The first two 
constants (C, D) are scale parameters. The last two con-
stants are the elasticity of supply of gidgets (e) and the elas-
ticity of excess supply of widgets to the U.S. market (f). 
Assuming that the U.S. gidget-widget market is charac-
terized by equations (7) through (10), the two measures of 
the injury caused by the subsidy, I and J, can be written as 
follows: 81 
(11) I - 1-(1+v)z 
and 
(12) J - 1-(1 +v)ez, 
where 
-bf 
(13) Z= 
(a + e)(d + f)-be. 
The two cross-elasticities of demand, b and c, are not in-
dependent of one another. Denoting by mw the share by 
value of the total gidget-widget market held by widgets, the 
share held by gidgets is 1-mw. Denoting the quotient of the 
widget market share and the gidget market share by M, so 
81. This result is based on a result derived by D. Rousslang & J. 
Suomela, Calculating the Consumer and Net Welfare Costs oflmport Re-
lief 74-76 (1985) (Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion, Staff Research Study Number 15) (available in the author's file at the 
offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York University 
School of Law). The following comparative-statics exercise is similar to 
the one given in Memorandum from the Director, Office of Economics, 
U.S. International Trade Commission, EC-J-010, at 29-31 (Jan. 7, 1986) 
(available in the author's file at the offices of the journal of International Law 
and Politics, New York University School of Law) (using producer surplus). 
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that M - mw/0-mw), the relation between the two cross-
elasticities is given by c=Mb. Substituting Mb for c in equa-
tion (13) yields: 
(14) z = -fb 
(a + e)(d + f)-Mb2 
Equations (11), (12), and (14) describe the effect of a subsidy 
to widgets on the price and output of gidgets as a function of 
the size of the subsidy, the market share of gidgets, and the 
various elasticities of demand and supply. 
One way for the Commission to make its injury determi-
nation is to use equations (11), (12), and (14) to calculate the 
percentage decreases in the price and output of gidgets from 
a given subsidy to widgets. By using estimated values for the 
parameters in equations {11), (12), and (14), the Commis-
sion can estimate the percentage declines in the price and 
output of the like product. Of course, for the Commission to 
calculate the precise amount of injury, it will have to be able 
to measure these parameters precisely. 82 In order for the 
Commission to base its determination on a mathematical cal-
culation, however, it will not be necessary for the Commis-
sion to measure the amount of injury precisely.s3 It will be 
sufficient if the Commission using reasonable estimates for 
the parameters, can conclude that the impact of the unfair 
practice is either likely or unlikely to be substantial enough 
to constitute material injury. Even though the economic ap-
proach to causation is not entirely precise, its use could im-
prove the accuracy and predictability of the Commission's 
determinations. This is in accord with congressional intent, 
and it would benefit the parties, their lawyers, and consum-
ers, who would all be better served by a more transparent 
and predictable process than the current one.s4 
82. In addition, the Commission will need a more fully developed and 
complete mathematical model to measure precisely the impact. That the 
precise impact of the subsidy can be calculated, at least in theory, with the 
approach I suggest, but not with the approach traditionally used by the 
Commission, underscores the poor economic foundation upon which the 
Commission traditionally bases its analysis of causation. 
83. Moreover, Title VII does not require such a precise calculation, 
although it is not prohibited either. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 47 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1979 
U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 444. 
84. According to the Ways and Means Committee Report, one of the 
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In order for the Commission to estimate the impact of 
the unfair practice, it will often be sufficient if the Commis-
sion can limit the ranges of the various elasticities. This sort 
of qualitative information is likely to be readily available to 
the Commission. For example, properly gathered consumer 
responses and pricing data should permit the Commission to 
conclude whether the imported article and the like product 
are good or poor substitutes for one another. In addition, 
the elasticities of demand for the imported product and the 
like product will be large when there are numerous suppliers 
of competing products. When there are few substitutes 
available, the demands will be inelastic. Similarly, the elas-
ticities of supply will be large when there is significant idle 
capacity, when capacity can be easily expanded (such as by 
converting existing plant and equipment), and when output 
can easily be diverted between markets. This is the sort of 
information that the Commission should be able to obtain 
through its study of the industry. Of course, the dumping 
and subsidy margins are reported to the Commission by the 
the Commerce Department and the Commission compiles 
market share data in almost every case. 
Even if precise estimates of the impact of the subsidy on 
the price and output of the like product could be made, the 
economic approach to causation would still not be exact. 
There are two reasons for this. First, there is no single mea-
sure of injury but instead two measures. These two meas-
ures are the decline in price and the decline in output of the 
like product. Of course, a single measure that is some ex-
plicit function of these two measures could be used; but no 
such measure is proposed in this paper. 85 Second, there is 
accomplishments of the 1979 GAIT negotiations was to provide for 
greater transparency in the administration of national antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 
(1979). Nonetheless, several lawyers who practice before the Commission 
have criticized the Commission for inadequately explaining the reasoning 
behind its determinations. See E. Easton, supra note 56, at 28-31; G. Hor-
lick & S. Landers, The Court of International Trade's Standard for Review 
of the International Trade Commission's Injury Determinations 6-7 (Sept. 
15, 1986) (presented at the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. 
Court of International Trade, Oct. 24, 1986) (available in the author's file 
at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York Uni-
versity School of Law). 
85. I have considered using producer revenue and the economic con-
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no precise definition of material. Even if there were a single 
measure of injury, it would still be up to each commissioner 
to determine how much injury is material. Although there 
can be an arbitrary definition of materiality, there is no theo-
retical reason for choosing one definition over another. 
Thus, a commissioner using the economic approach will still 
have substantial leeway even after the impact of the subsidy 
on the price and output of the like product is calculated 
when he makes a determination. However, over time a com-
missioner's leeway will contract as the commissioner issues 
more determinations and thus implicitly defines the relation 
between the two measures of injury and the standard for ma-
teriality. 
B. Factors Affecting the Injury from an Unfair Practice 
Another reason for using a mathematical model is that 
the model can be used to derive economic relations between 
the parameters of the model and the injury to the domestic 
industry from the unfair trade practice. These relations can 
be used by the Commission and the general public to im-
prove their understanding of how the proposed approach is 
applied. By understanding how various market conditions, 
such as market share, elasticity of demand, and elasticity of 
supply, relate to the injury to the domestic industry from a 
given subsidy, the public could more accurately assess what 
the Commission's final determination will be using the eco-
nomic approach and thereby improve the predictability of 
the Commission's determinations.s6 
The relation between any parameter of the model (a, b, 
d, e, f, M, or v) and the injury to the domestic gidget industry 
from a subsidy to Lilliputian widgets can be found by differ-
entiating equations ( 11) and ( 12), after substituting for Z 
from equation (14), with respect to the parameter. The rela-
tionship between each factor and the injury to the domestic 
industry is described below. 
cept of producer surplus but have not yet been able to conclude that the 
use of either as the sole measure of injury would be appropriate. 
86. Memorandum from the Director, supra note 81, at 29-31, gives a 
discussion of some of these economic relations. 
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l. The Unfair Trade Margin 
Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the injury to domes-
tic gidget producers from a given subsidy on widgets is re-
lated to the size of the subsidy itself. The effect on gidget 
producers of increasing the subsidy on widgets is found by 
substituting for Z in equations (ll) and (12) from equation 
(14) and differentiating the resulting equations with respect 
to v.87 As intuition suggests, increasing the subsidy will 
cause a decline in the price and quantity of gidgets sold in 
the U.S. market. Thus, the larger the subsidy received by 
widget producers, the greater the injury to the domestic 
gidget industry, and the more likely is it that the domestic 
gidget industry has been materially injured as a result of the 
subsidy to widgets. 
2. Own-Price Elasticity of Demand for Gidgets 
Another factor that is related to the magnitude of the 
injury caused by the subsidy is the own-price elasticity of de-
mand for gidgets. The more elastic the demand for gidgets, 
the smaller the relative declines in the price and quantity of 
gidgets from a given subsidy to widgets.88 Conversely, the 
less elastic the U.S. demand for gidgets, the greater the rela-
tive declines in price and quantity from the export subsidy to 
widgets. Therefore, the less elastic the U.S. demand for 
87. The derivatives are as follows: 
dl = -Z(l+v)Z-1>0 
dv 
and 
~ = -eZ(l +v)~z-l >O-
dv 
To say that the derivatives of I andJ with respect to v are positive means 
that the relative declines in price and quantity from the subsidy are greater 
the larger the subsidy is. 
88_ The derivatives are as follows: 
da 
-ln(l +v)k(l +v)Zfb(d+f) <0 
dl 
and 
~ = -ln(l+v)k(l+v)ezefb(d+£)<0, 
da 
where k = [(a+e)(d+f)-Mb2)-2• 
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gidgets, the greater the injury from a given subsidy to wid-
gets. 
3. Own-Price Elasticity of Demand for Widgets 
There is a similar relation between the own-price elastic-
ity of demand for widgets and the injury to the domestic 
gidget industry from a subsidy on widgets. The less elastic 
the U.S. demand for widgets, the greater the injury to the 
domestic gidget industry from a given subsidy on widgets.89 
The economic intuition behind this result is that if demand 
for widgets is relatively elastic, the subsidy, which increases 
the supply of widgets, will generally increase U.S. consump-
tion of widgets without causing U.S. widget prices to decline 
substantially. Consequently, if the subsidy does not cause 
widget prices to decline by very much, the prices and sales of 
domestic gidget producers will not decline by very much 
either. 
4. Substitutability of Gidgets and Widgets 
The fourth factor that affects the magnitude of the in-
jury experienced by the gidget industry as a result of the sub-
sidy is the substitutability of gidgets and widgets. The 
higher the degree of substitution between gidgets and wid-
gets, the larger are both the decrease in the price of gidgets 
and the decrease in the output of gidgets from a given sub-
sidy on widgets. 90 The economic intuition behind this result 
is that the higher the degree of substitution between widgets 
89. The derivatives are as follows: 
:~ = -ln(l+v)k(l+v)zfb(a+e)<O 
and 
fct = -ln(l+v)k(l+v)eZefb(a+e)<O. 
90. The only measure of the substitutability of widgets and gidgets in 
equations (12), (13), and (14) is the elasticity of demand for gidgets with 
respect to the price of widgets, b. Given the market share of gidgets, how-
ever, the cross-elasticities (the elasticity of demand for gidgets with respect 
to the price of widgets and the elasticity of demand for widgets with re-
spect to the price of gidgets) are positive multiples of one another; thus, 
the larger b is, the larger c is. In addition, the larger b and c are, the 
greater is the elasticity of substitution between gidgets and widgets. The 
derivatives of I and J with respect to b are as follows: 
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and gidgets, the greater will be the diversion of sales from 
gidgets to widgets as a result of the subsidy, and the greater 
will be the pressure on domestic producers to lower prices in 
order to reduce this diversion brought about by the decrease 
in the price of widgets.9 1 
5. Market Share of Widgets 
The market share of widgets is also related to the magni-
tude of the injury caused by the subsidy. The larger the mar-
ket share of widgets, the greater the injury to the domestic 
gidget industry.92 The economic intuition behind this result 
is as follows. Since the elasticity of supply of widgets to the 
U.S. market is assumed constant, then for any given price for 
widgets, the percentage increase in widget exports caused by 
the subsidy will be independent of the market share held by 
widgets. However, although the percentage increase in wid-
get sales is independent of market share, the absolute in-
crease in widget sales as a result of the subsidy is greater the 
larger the share of the market held by widgets before the 
subsidy is given. Thus, the larger the market share of wid-
gets, the greater the increase in widgets sold from a given 
subsidy; and the greater the increase in widgets from the 
~~ = ln(l +v)k(l +v)z[(a+e)(d+f)+Mb2]f>0 
and 
it, = ln(l +v)k(l +vtZ[(a+e)(d+f)+Mb2]ef>0. 
91. This result is the opposite of the result in antitrust analysis, in 
which injury is more likely the more differentiated the goods are. SeeR. 
PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw 125-34 (1976). The reason for this difference is 
that antitrust law is concerned with injury to consumers from raising 
prices, whereas the antidumping and countervailing duty law is concerned 
with injury to competing domestic producers from reducing prices. Pro-
ducers raise their prices more easily when their merchandise is differenti-
ated in the eyes of consumers, whereas they maintain their prices with 
more difficulty when competing producers lower their prices and their 
merchandise is not differentiated in the eyes of consumers. 
92. The derivatives are as follows: 
:~ = ln(l+v)k(l+v)zfb3 >0 
and 
fM = ln(l+v)k(l+vtzefb3 >0. 
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subsidy, the greater the injury to the competing domestic in-
dustry._ 
6. Supply Elasticities 
The supply elasticities are also related to the size of the 
injury to the domestic industry from the subsidy. The more 
elastic the supply of widgets to the United States, the greater 
the injury to the domestic industry producing gidgets from a 
given subsidy to widgets.93 The economic intuition behind 
this result is that the subsidy will increase imports by a larger 
amount the more elastic is the supply of imports to the 
United States. For gidgets, the relationship between the 
elasticity of supply of gidgets and the injury to the industry 
producing gidgets is ambiguous. The relative decline in the 
price of gidgets is larger the less elastic is the supply of 
gidgets, whereas the relative decline in the quantity of 
gidgets is larger the more elastic is the supply of gidgets.94 
The intuition here is that the subsidy shifts the demand 
curve for gidgets and the more elastic the supply of gidgets 
the more this shift is translated into a reduction in output 
and the less it is translated into a reduction in price, and con-
versely. 
7. The Role of the Factors in Inferring Injury 
The discussion in the last few paragraphs does not apply 
only to hypothetical widgets and gidgets, nor are the rela-
tions likely to change if a more general model were used. 
The injury to any domestic industry from a subsidy to a com-
peting imported product will depend on the size of the sub-
93. The derivatives are as follows: 
~~ = ln(l+v)k(l+v)z[(a+e)d-Mb2]b>0 
and 
~ = ln(l +v)k(l +vYz[(a+e)d-Mb2]eb>0. 
94. The derivatives are as follows: 
dl = -ln(l+v)k(l+v)ezfb(d+f)<O 
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sidy, the elasticity of demand for the like product, the elastic-
ity of demand for the imported product, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the like product and the imported product, 
the market shares of the two products, and the elasticities of 
supply of the two products to the U.S. market. In general, 
the injury to the domestic industry will be greater the larger 
the subsidy, the less elastic the demands for the like product 
and the imported product, the more substitutable the two 
products are, the larger the market share held by the im-
ported product, and the more elastic the supply of the im-
ported product. 
The above discussion suggests a second method that the 
Commission can use to make its statutory determination. 
The Commission can make its determination by looking at 
the above factors, noting the size of the subsidy and the im-
port penetration ratio, assessing the magnitudes for the vari-
ous elasticities, and making ajudgment as to whether the im-
pact of the subsidy is large enough for it to have materially 
injured the domestic industry.95 These factors can also be 
used by the Commission to check its conclusions if it chooses 
to make mathematical estimates of the relative declines and 
by the parties to understand how strong or how weak a par-
ticular case is before the Commission makes its determina-
tion.96 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the Commission 
should use these factors to assist it in making a reasoned 
judgment about the impact of the subsidy on the price and 
quantity of the like product. These factors are not substi-
tutes for the statutory factors. The statutory factors, which 
are mostly various effects that the unfair practice has had, are 
rarely directly observable. In most investigations, it will not 
be possible for the Commission to observe directly the de-
95. The same analysis with some modifications could be used if imports 
were the statutory cause. The only changes are that if imports are the 
statutory cause, the two factors that relate the effect of the unfair practice 
to the level of imports, the unfair trade margin and the elasticity of supply 
of imports to the United States, would not be used. 
96. It should be emphasized that the two methods of implementing the. 
economic approach, the mathematical equation and the factors, are not 
different approaches but different ways of implementing the same ap-
proach. Moreover, the factors were derived from the equations, such that 
the two methods are consistent. 
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clines in price, output, and employment that domestic pro-
ducers suffer because of a subsidy. 97 In those cases where 
the impact of the subsidy cannot be observed directly, the 
factors discussed in this section can be used to indirectly as-
sess the effects that the statute requires the Commission to 
consider when it makes its determination. Thus, the eco-
nomic approach to causation would not supplant the statute; 
rather, its use permits the Commission to fulfill its statutory 
obligation. 
V. JusTIFICATION OF THE EcoNOMIC APPROACH TO INJURY 
This section makes three broad arguments on the 
proper interpretation of Title VII: (1) that a single determi-
nation of injury and causation should be made; (2) that the 
causal factor is the unfair trade practice, and not the imports 
that benefit from the unfair trade practice; and (3) that the 
causal factor must materially injure the competing domestic 
industry. In order for the Commission to use the economic 
approach to injury suggested in this Article, these three in-
terpretations must be reasonable interpretations of the law. 
As is shown below, there is authority for all three interpreta-
tions. 
A. Material Injury-Unitary v. Bifurcated Approaches 
Title VII directs the Commission to determine whether 
the domestic industry has been materially injured by reason 
of the unfairly traded imports. In making its determination, 
the Commission is to consider, in addition to any other fac-
tors it considers relevant, the quantity of the imports, the ef-
fect of the imports on prices, and the impact of the imports 
on the domestic industry.98 It is this last direction, to con-
sider the impact on the domestic industry, that is usually 
cited by the Commission to justify its practice of bifurcating 
the injury and causation tests.99 Furthermore, the Commis-
97. It will be just as impossible for the Commission to observe directly 
the effects of the imports. 
98. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, USITC Pub. 
1966, Inv. No. 701-TA-281, at 10 n.28 (Apr.l987) (final); Certain Fresh 
Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel, 
Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Peru, USITC Pub. 1877, Inv. Nos. 
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sion's bifurcated approach to material injury and its· weak 
causation standard, which requiref that the imports only 
contribute to the condition of the industry, are related. 
The Commission has justified its use of a weak causation 
standard by the legislative directive that the imports be a 
cause of material injury, and not the cause. 100 Several com-
missioners have argued, and the Court of International 
Trade (CIT) has held, that by not requiring the imports to be 
the cause of material injury, Congress intended for the Com-
mission to make an affirmative determination whenever the 
imports contribute to the state of the industry.l01 The pro-
ponents of this position read the phrase "material injury" to 
modify the state of the domestic industry, not the effect of 
the unfair practice on the domestic industry, leaving no addi-
tional statutory guidance to describe the impact of the unfair 
practice. Thus, the CIT has reasoned that because material 
injury describes the state of the industry and the legislative 
history instructs the Commission not to compare the impact 
of the unfair imports with the impact of other causes, only 
the slightest impact by the imports is required to satisfy the 
causation requirement.1o2 · 
This interpretation, however, misconstrues the statutory 
language al}d the legislative history. Nowhere does the stat-
ute contain an injury test separate and apart from the causa-
tion test. Although the statute instructs the Commission to 
consider the impact of the unfair imports on the domestic 
industry, this does not mean that the Commission should in-
quire into the state of the industry independently of the ef-
fect of the imports. The statute only requires that the Com-
mission determine whether the domestic industry has been 
303-TA-17, -18, 701-TA-275 to -278, and 731-TA-327 to -334, at 9 (July 
1986) (preliminary). 
100. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1979); S. REP. 
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CoNG. & 
AoMIN. NEws 381, 443 (the issue is not whether subsidized or less-than-
fair-value "imports are the principal, a substantial, or a significant cause of 
material injury"). 
101. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 405,413 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1984); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, USITC 
Pub. No. 701-TA-257, at 14-15, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2582-83 (1986) 
(Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, Comm'rs) (final) (three-to-three affirmative on 
whole fish). 
102. See British Steel, 593 F. Supp. at 413. 
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materially injured by reason of certain imports and that the 
Commission. in making this determination, should examine 
factors that indicate the health of the industry. Instructing 
the Commission to examine factors that relate to the health 
of the domestic industry does not mean that these factors 
should be looked at in a vacuum independently of the effect 
of the unfair trade practice. nor does it mean the Commis-
sion should make a determination whether or not the indus-
try is healthy. Furthermore, requiring that the imports be a 
cause of material injury only implies that there can be other 
causes ofmaterial injury. When Congress directed the Com-
mission not to weigh the injury from the imports against the 
impact of any other causes, 103 Congress was simply telling 
the Commission to determine whether the imports have 
caused material injury. It stretches both the statutory lan-
guage and the legislative history to read the congressional 
directive that the Commission should not weigh causes to 
imply that the Commission should use a separate injury test 
and require only a small contributing effect.I04 
Conceptually, a bifurcated approach makes no sense. 
Whether the domestic industry is doing well or not is not the 
issue; the issue is whether the domestic industry would be 
doing better but for the unfair practice. 105 A growing, highly 
profitable industry can be adversely affected by unfair im-
ports as can a declining, unprofitable industry. 106 
103. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1979); S. REP. No. 
249, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 74, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 381, 460. 
104. It is especially troublesome for the Commission to rely on legisla-
tive history that instructs it not to weigh causes to justify an approach in 
which the outcome of any investigation largely depends on other causes. 
105. See Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 649 
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (purpose of Commission investigation is not to de-
termine whether the domestic industry is healthy but to determine what 
effect the imports have had on the domestic industry), vacated by American 
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986); but see American 
Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1984) (the industry must be in a state of injury and the imports 
must be a cause of that injury), aff'd sub nom. Armco Inc. v. United States, 
760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
106. There could be a policy reason for granting relief more easily to 
declining industries than to growing industries. Harm by unfair imports 
to a declining industry exacerbates the decline and produces more idle 
capital and more unemployed workers. If one assumes that adjustment 
-------
~----
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There is one more point to make about the bifurcated 
approach traditionally used by the Commission. Because an 
absolute standard for injury is coupled with a weak causation 
test, the Commission's determination might depend primar-
ily on the state of the industry. The state of the industry, 
however, can depend on a multitude of factors that are unre-
lated to the unfair imports, such as exchange rate fluctua-
tions or where the economy is in the current business cy-
cle.to7 
. An examination of the case law does not require a differ-
ent conclusion. American Spring Wire Corp.'v. United States 108 is 
frequently cited as the leading case supporting the bifurcated 
approach. 109 In American Spring Wire, the CIT, in upholding a 
negative injury determination by the Commission, held that 
the Commission must find both injury and causation. The 
CIT reasoned that the statute requires both that the injury 
be material and that it be by reason of the imports. In other 
words, the Commission cannot make an affirmative determi-
nation unless there is both injury and causation. Therefore, 
the CIT concluded that it was proper for the Commission to 
base its negative determination on the absence of material 
costs are lower for firms that are expanding than for firms that are con-
tracting, then, other things being equal, the harm to a declining industry 
from unfair imports in general will exceed the harm to a growing industry. 
This effect, however, can be taken into account when measuring the im-
pact of the practice without bifurcating the determination. 
There could be a political reason for granting relief only to declining 
industries. Congress may desire to protect workers and investors in de-
clining industries but not workers and investors in growing industries, be-
cause their suffering, though not their injury from unfair trade practices, 
can be observed in declining industries, but neither their suffering nor 
their injury from unfair trade practices can be observed in growing indus-
tries. Such an approach to protecting domestic industries may be politi-
cally expedient, but the antidumping and countervailing duty laws would 
be a poor means of implementing such a policy, because the relief is unre-
lated to the suffering. However, there is no indication that this approach 
is what Congress intended when it passed the I 979 Act. 
107. This problem is exacerbated by allowing the petitioner to choose 
when to file its petition. See E. Easton, supra note 56, at 19. 
108. 590 F. Supp. 1273 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd sub nom. Armco Inc. 
v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
109. E.g., Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereoffrom 
Japan, USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207, at 20-21, 8 I.T.R.D. 
(BNA) at 1231-32 (1 985) (Eckes, Comm'r) (final). 
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injury using a bifurcated approach.IIO 
The CIT's reasoning is not persuasive. It makes no 
sense to read the statutory language "material injury ... by 
reason of" to permit a bifurcated approach, because it would 
not be sufficient if the "by reason of" standard was met but 
the "material injury" standard was not. 
Moreover, even by its own terms, the CIT's opinion in 
American Spring Wire does not preclude a unitary approach. 
Certainly, there must be both injury and causation, and both 
the unitary and bifurcated approaches require injury and 
causation. The difference is that the unitary approach views 
"material injury ... by reason of" as both effect and cause, 
whereas the bifurcated approach views "by reason of" as 
both effect and cause and material injury as a separate in-
quiry. Thus, with the unitary approach it is impossible to 
have injury without causation, or vice versa, but with the bi-
furcated approach it is possible to have only injury or causa-
tion. Consequently, the CIT's opinion upholding a determi-
nation that the CIT admits was not explicitly bifurcated111 
should not be read to preclude a unitary approach on the 
grounds that the statute requires both injury and causation. 
B. The Statutory Cause-The Unfair Practice v. The Imports 
The statute requires that the domestic industry be mate-
rially injured "by reason of" dumped and subsidized im-
ports. The commissioners who adhere to the traditional ap-
proach interpret this language to mean that the Commission 
should determine whether the imports, and not the unfair 
practice, have caused material injury to the domestic indus-
try.112 The advocates of this position argue that the above 
110. American Spring Wire, 590 F. Supp. at 1276-77. 
111. Id. at 1277. 
112. See, e.g., Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, supra note 
62, at 13-15 (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, Comm'rs); Certain Fresh Atlantic 
Groundfish from Canada, USITC Pub. 1844, Inv. No. 701-TA-257, at 13-
17, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2582-85 (1986) (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, 
Comm'rs) (final). See also Perry, supra note 45, at 415-23 (review of com-
missioners' opinions in the debate on margins). Whether the Commission 
should consider the size of the unfair trade practice is examined in an ex-
cellent debate. Compare Easton & Perry, The Causation of Material Injury: 
Changes in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 35 (1983) (Commission 
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statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and thus, re-
sort to the legislative history is inappropriate; II!J however, 
their arguments are unsound. 
1. Statutory Language 
The statute requires that the Commission determine 
whether the domestic industry is materially injured "by rea-
son of imports of the merchandise with respect to which [the 
Commerce Department] has made an affirmative determina-
tion." Both the term "imports" and the phrase "by reason 
of" are ambiguous. For example, the term "imports" could 
refer to any of three classes of imports: (I) the additional 
imports that result from the dumping or subsidization; (2) 
the imports that the Commerce Department has found to be 
dumped or subsidized; or (3) the imports over which the 
Commerce Department calculates the weighted-average 
margin of dumping or subsidization, including those that 
were neither dumped nor subsidized. 11 4 
The phrase "by reason of" is also ambiguous, as it 
could refer to either the full effect of the imports or the effect 
should consider effect of imports), with Palmeter, Countervailing Subsidized 
Imports: The International Trade Commission Goes Astray, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN 
LJ. 1 (1983) (Commission should consider effect of unfair practice). 
113. Certain Welded Pipes and Tubes from the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1519, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-131, -132, -138, at 11, 6 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1891, 1896-1900 (1984) (final); Certain Carbon Steel 
Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331, lnv. Nos. 701-TA-155, -157 to-
160, -162, at 14, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2030, 2035 (1983) (final); Certain Steel 
Wire Nails from Korea, USITC Pub. 1223, Inv. No. 701-TA-145, at 15, 3 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1931, 1937-38 (1982) (Calhoun, V. Chairman) (prelimi-
nary). 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, a statute dear and unambigu-
ous on its face must be interpreted according to its facial meaning without 
resorting to the statute's legislative history. A statute that is not clear and 
unambiguous should only be interpreted after considering its legislative 
history. 2 A. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 45.02 (4th 
ed. 1972). 
114. It is interesting that some of the Commissioners who have argued 
that the phrase "by reason of" is dear and unambiguous have adopted the 
broadest and perhaps least obvious definition of imports. See, e.g., Heavy-
Walled Rectangular Welded Pipes and Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 
1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 27-28, 81.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1786-88 (Eckes, 
Comm'r, dissenting) (final) (Commission should consider neither the 
dumping margin nor the portion of imports found to be dumped). 
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of the imports through the dumping or subsidization. To 
see why the injury caused by the unfair practice is "by reason 
of" the imports, assume that the Lilliputian widget subsidy 
applies only to widgets from one region of Lilliput, so that 
only a portion of the widgets sold in the United States will 
benefit from the subsidy. However, because all widgets are 
identical, all will sell for a lower price in the United States as 
a result of the subsidy to some of them. Thus, a subsidy to 
some widgets affects U.S. gidget producers through all wid-
gets, subsidized and unsubsidized. More generally, the ef-
fects of dumping and subsidization on the domestic industry 
are transmitted through both fairly and unfairly traded im-
ports. Thus, when the unfair practice is the statutory cause, 
the injury is still "by reason of" the imports. 
In addition, the language of the statute suggests that the 
causal factor is the unfair practice. Congress has provided 
the Commission with the following direction for making its 
determination of threat of material injury in countervailing 
duty investigations: 
Nature of subsidy. In determining whether 
there is a threat of material injury, the Commission 
shall consider such information as may be 
presented to it by [the Commerce Department] as 
to the nature of the subsidy (particularly as to 
whether the subsidy is an export subsidy inconsis-
tent with the Agreement) provided by a foreign 
country and the effects likely to be caused by the 
subsidy .115 
In a Title VII case, if the causal factor is not the unfair prac-
tice, it is not clear why the likely effects of the subsidy would 
be relevant for a determination in a countervailng duty case. 
In addition, if Congress wanted the Commission to 
make its causation determination by assessing how much 
better off the domestic industry would be if all the imports 
under investigation were excluded from the U.S. market, 
Congress could have clearly told the Commission to do so. 
The statute, however, does hot direct the Commission to as-
certain whether the condition of the domestic industry would 
be materially improved if all the merchandise of the class or 
ll!>. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(i) (1982). 
----·--.. . ...__ 
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kind that the Commerce Department has found to be un-
fairly traded were excluded from the U.S. market. Such a 
formulation would be unambiguous and would require the 
Commission to use an all-imports standard. Yet this is not 
how Congress drafted the statute, and it is inappropriate for 
the Commission to interpret it in this way based on the lan-
guage of only one portion of the statute and without consid-
ering the legislative history. 
2. Legislative History 
The legislative history provides some guidance for what 
Congress meant by the phrase "by reason of imports of the 
merchandise with respect to which (the Commerce Depart-
ment] has made an affirmative determination." On several 
occasions Congress instructed the Commission to examine 
the effect of the dumping or subsidy on the domestic indus-
try. The Senate Report specifically directed the Commission 
to consider the effect of the dumping or subsidy: 
[F]or one type of product, price may be the key fac-
tor in making a decision as to which product to 
purchase and a small price differential resulting 
from the amount of the subsidy or the margin of 
dumping can be decisive; for others, the size of the 
differential may be of lesser significance. 116 
Moreover, in 1979, President Carter submitted a trade bill to 
Congress accompanied by Statements of Administrative Ac-
tion describing how the proposed legislation was to be ad-
116. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979). The House Re~ 
port contains nearly identical language. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 
lst Sess. 46, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 381,474. 
The following are additional examples of Congress' direction to the 
Commission to consider the effect of the unfair trade practice: "Section 
705 [19 U.S.C. § 1671d] provides for final determinations on investiga~ 
tions by [Commerce] and the [Commission] on the question of whether or 
not imported merchandise is receiving a subsidy which is causing material 
injury to a domestic industry." H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
55 (1979). The Commission "considers, among other factors, ... how the 
effects of the net bounty or grant relate to the injury, if any, to the domes~ 
tic industry." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1979 
U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 381,443. "[T]he Commission must sat~ 
isfy itself that, in light of all the information presented, there is a sufficient 
causal link between the subsidization and the requisite injury." /d. at 58. 
l I 
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ministered. With respect to material injury, the Statements 
declared: 
It is expected that in its investigation the Com-
mission will continue to focus on the conditions of 
trade and development within the industry con-
cerned. For one industry, an apparently small vol-
ume of imports may have a significant impact on the 
market; for another the same volume might not be 
significant. Similarly, for one type of product, price 
may be the key factor in determining sales elasticity, 
and a small price differential resulting from the 
amount of the subsidy or the margin of dumping 
can be decisive; in others the size of the margin may 
be of lesser significance. 
The petitioner must demonstrate, and the 
Commission must satisfy itself that, in light of all 
the information presented, there is the requisite 
causal link between the subsidization or dumping 
and material injury .111 
Congress approved these Statements as submitted to it by 
the President as part of the 1979 Act. 118 Thus, the language 
of the Statements and the legislative history of the 1979 Act 
strongly support the unfair practice interpretation. 
It must be conceded that the legislative history speaks of 
the effects of the dumped or subsidized imports with about 
the same frequency that it speaks of the effects of the dump-
ing or subsidization. For example, the House Report states: 
"In determining whether such injury is 'by reason of' such 
imports, the [Commission] looks at the effects of such im-
ports on the domestic industry." 119 However, it would be 
inappropriate to conclude that the legislative history is con-
117. STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 434-35, reprinted in 1979 U.S. ConE CoNe. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 665, 669-70. 
118. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1982). 
119. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1979). The Senate 
Report contains similar language. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1979 U.S. ConE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 461 
("the Commission must satisfy itself that, in light of all the information 
presented, there is a sufficient causal link between the less-than-fair-value 
imports and the requisite injury"). 
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tradictory and provides no indication of Congressional in-
tent. The apparent shifting back and forth between the ef-
fects of the imports and the effects of the unfair practice sug-
gests that Congress intended for the Commission to assess 
the effects of the imports through the unfair practice and 
that the phrase "by reason of the imports" means the effect 
of the imports through the unfair practice. 
3. The GATT 
Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 in 
order to bring U.S. law into conformity with the interna-
tional obligations of the United States. 120 The language of 
the GATT agreements provides further support for the use 
of an unfair-practice standard. In addition, by adopting an 
all-import standard over an unfair-practice standard, the 
Commission has unnecessarily put the United States in viola-
tion of the GATT, since the GATT requires that the unfair 
practice be the cause of material injury before an antidump-
ing or countervailing duty can be imposed. Article VI of the 
GATT, which covers antidumping and countervailing duties, 
contains the following language: 
No contracting party shall levy an antidumping or 
countervailing duty on the importations of any 
product of the territory of another contracting party 
unless it determines that the effect of the dumping 
or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to 
cause or threaten material injury to an established 
domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially 
the establishment of a domestic industry. 12 1 
Thus, the Commission's practice is contrary to Article VI of 
the GATT. 
The Codes support this interpretation of Title VII. The 
Codes contain language about the effects of the imports 
from which the language of Title VII was derived. For exam-
ple, Article 6 of the Subsidies Code contains the following 
directions for making injury determinations: 
1. A determination of injury for purposes of Arti-
cle VI of the General Agreement shall involve an 
120. 19 u.s.c. § 2503 (1982). 
121. GATT, supra note 12, art. VI, § 5. 
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objective examination of both (a) the volume of 
subsidized imports and their effect on prices in the 
domestic market for like products and (b) the con-
sequent impact of these imports on domestic pro-
ducers of such products. 
2. With regard to volume of subsidized imports 
the investigating authorities shall consider whether 
there has been a significant increase in subsidized 
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to pro-
duction or consumption in the importing signatory. 
With regard to the effect of the subsidized imports 
on prices, the investigating authorities shall con-
sider whether there has been a significant price un-
dercutting by the subsidized imports as compared 
with the price of a like product of the importing sig-
natory, or whether the effect of such imports is 
otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree 
or prevent price increases, which otherwise would 
have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or 
several of these factors can necessarily give decisive 
guidance. 
3. The examination of the impact on the domestic 
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all 
relevant economic factors and indices having a 
bearing on the state of the industry such as actual 
and potential decline in output, sales, market share, 
profits, productivity, return on investments, or utili-
zation of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; 
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to 
raise capital or investment and, in the case of agri-
culture, whether there has been an increased bur-
den on Government support pro-grammes. This list 
is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these 
factors necessarily give decisive guidance. 122 
The Subsidy Code then goes on to explain what is meant by 
the phrase "the impact of these imports" by requiring that 
122. Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. VI, paras. 1-3 (footnotes omit-
ted). See also Antidumping Code, supra note 14, art. III, paras. 1-3 (con-
taining almost identical language). 
------=---... _ 
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the impact of the imports be through the effects of the unfair 
practice: 
4. It must be demonstrated that the subsidized im-
ports are, through the effects 19 of the subsidy, caus-
ing injury within the meaning of this [Code]. There 
may be other factors which at the same time are in-
juring the domestic industry, and the injuries 
caused by other factors must not be attributed to 
the subsidized imports. 
19. As set forth in paras. 2 and 3 of this Article. 123 
The argument that the Subsidies Code does not require 
that the subsidy cause injury to the domestic industry rests 
on footnote 19 in paragraph 4. According to the proponents 
of this view, injury does not have to be caused by the subsidy 
because the effects of the subsidy are assessed by the impact 
of the imports. 124 There are several problems with this in-
terpretation of the Subsidies Code. First, this interpretation 
reads the phrase "through the effects of the subsidy" out of 
the Subsidies Code entirely. Second, footnote 19 only refers 
to certain factors to be considered in assessing the effects of 
the subsidy. These factors-increased imports, price under-
cutting by the imports, and price suppression-can all be 
traced to the subsidy. As discussed previously, the effects of 
the subsidy are transmitted to the domestic industry by 
means of the price and quantity of the imports. Thus, foot-
note 19, which says that the impact of the unfair practice re-
quires consideration of the price and quantity of the imports, 
should not be read to require that the imports cause the in-
JUry. 
When using the GA Tr Codes as an aid for interpreting 
Title VII, it is important to decide what weight should be 
given to the Codes. The Codes are not self-implementing, 
and the 1979 Act states that conflicts between U.S. law and 
123. Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. VI, para. 4 (footnote omitted). 
See also Antidumping Code, supra note 14, art. III, para. 4 (containing al-
most identical language). 
124. See Easton & Perry, supra note 112, at 47-48 (arguing that footnote 
4 of the Antidumping Code, supra note 14, art. III, para. 4, and footnote 
19 of the Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. VI, para. 4, which refer to 
language about the dumped and subsidized imports, indicate that the ef-
fects of the dumping or subsidy are assessed by the effects of the imports). 
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the Codes should be resolved in favor of U.S. law.l25 None-
theless, Congress enacted the 1979 Act to bring U.S. law 
into conformity with the Codes,126 and there is no indication 
in the legislative history that Congress was enacting a law so 
seriously at odds with the Codes. 
4. Statutory Remedies 
The applicable statutory remedies provide further sup-
port for the position that the Commission should concen-
trate on the effects of the unfair practice. The Title VII rem-
edies do not eliminate the harm from the imports entirely, 
but only the harm from the unfair practice.l27 The statute 
imposes a duty equal to the magnitude of the unfair prac-
tice, 128 which is intended to raise the price of the imports, 
not eliminate them. Moreover, Congress has granted the 
Commerce Department the authority to settle a case by ac-
cepting an agreement to eliminate the dumping or subsidiza-
tion and, in extraordinary circumstances, to accept agree-
ments that only eliminate the resultant injurious effects. 
Thus, it is not necessary for an importer to cease importing 
entirely to settle a case}29 
5. Statutory ~f<Poses 
Intuitively, it makes no sense to use an all-import stan-
dard. The impact of the imports on the competing domestic 
producers is measured by the difference between the state 
the industry is in today and the state the industry would be in 
today if the unfairly-traded imports were excluded from the 
U.S. market. Only when there would be no imports but for 
the dumping or subsidy would the injury from the imports 
be as l.arge as the injury from the unfair practice. There is, 
however, no suggestion that Title VII is intended to prevent 
imports. Title VII is aimed at two practices-dumping and 
subsidization, which Congress believes can injure domestic 
125. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 41 (1979). 
126. 19 U.S.C. § 2503; H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 
(1979). 
127. But see infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text. 
128. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, re-
printed in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 423. 
129. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167lc(b)-(c), 1673c(b)-(c) (1982). 
1989] AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 89 
producers. Therefore, for the purpose of the antidumping 
and countervailing duty laws, the Commission should carry 
out its statutory directive by assessing whether the dumping 
or the subsidy has materially injured the domestic industry, 
and not by inquiring into the full effect of the imports. 1S0 
6. Case Law 
The CIT has stated that the Commission is neither re-
quired to use the unfair trade margin reported by the Com-
merce Department in its determinations, nor is it prohibited 
from doing so. In two recent cases, Copperweld Corp. v. United 
States 131 and Hyundai Pipe Co., Ltd. v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission, 132 the CIT held that the Commission may, but 
need not, consider the unfair trade margin in assessing cau-
sation. In neither of these cases did the CIT rule that Con-
gress intended for the Commission to determine whether the 
130. It should be pointed out that the Commission in its review investi-
gations examines the effect of the unfair trade practice. When reviewing 
an outstanding order, the Commission predicts how the producers that 
are covered by the outstanding antidumping or countervailing duty order 
would respond to the order's revocation. It then inquires whether the for-
eign producers' resulting lower prices and increased exports would mate-
rially iJ1iure the domestic producers. The Commission's use of this stan-
dard was upheld in American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 269, 
271-72 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Commission's approach to causation in re-
view investigations is the mirror image of the economic approach. Conse-
quently, the approach the Commission uses in its review investigations is 
inconsistent with the approach it traditionally uses in its final investiga-
tions. Thus, on the same facts the Commission could reach both an af-
firmative determination in a final antidumping or countervailing duty in-
vestigation and revoke the order in a review investigation. Such a result is 
possible when the imports hold a large share of the market and the margin 
of dumping or subsidization is small. In such a case, the imports will have 
a large effect on the domestic industry while the unfair practice will have a 
small effect. 
Of course, the Commission's own procedures cannot take precedence 
over the statutory language enacted by Congress. See Cubanski v. Heckler, 
794 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski,]., dissenting from rejec-
tion of suggestion for rehearing en bane). The lesson to be learned from 
the Commission's review investigations is that the unfair practice standard 
is intuitively appealing, whereas the alternative approach of looking at the 
effects of all imports is not. 
131. 682 F. Supp. 552, 558-64 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). 
132. 670 F. Supp. 357, 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). 
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unfair practice injured the domestic industry. 133 Instead, the 
CIT reasoned that Title VII directs the Commission to con-
sider certain specific factors, such as price suppression, in 
addition to other factors, and that the Commerce Depart-
ment's unfair trade margins are such an other factor. 134 
Consequently, the reasoning underlying these decisions is 
faulty. The unfair trade margin is not one of the effects that 
the unfair practice or the imports have on the domestic in-
dustry. The answer to the question should the Commission 
consider the unfair practice depends on what the statutory 
cause is. The statutory cause is either the imports, in which 
case the margin should not be used, or the unfair practice, in 
which case it should be used. 135 
On three occasions the CIT explicitly stated that the 
Commission is not required to consider the unfair trade 
practice. Although the CIT addressed the proper question 
in all of these cases-whether the imports or the unfair prac-
tice is the proper statutory cause-its reasoning is not per-
suasive. In the earliest of the three cases, the CIT merely 
stated in dicta that Title VII does not require that the subsidy 
cause injury. 136 The second case, Maine Potato Council v. 
United States, was the first case to address, and reject, a claim 
that the Commission must determine whether the unfair 
practice has caused injury. 137 The reasoning in Maine Potato 
Council is not convincing because the court's opinion ignores 
most authority. According to the CIT, the Commission had 
looked at the unfair trade margin in only one prior investiga"" 
tion. 138 The opinion thus ignores a substantial prior practice 
by the Commission of looking at unfair trade margins.l39 
133. Copperweld, 682 F. Supp. at 552-77; Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at 
357-62. 
134. Copperweld, 682 F. Supp. at 560-64; Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at 
360. 
135. It may be possible for the CIT to conclude that either interpreta-
tion of the statute is reasonable. Such ajudgment, however, should not be 
made by treating margins as another factor but by concluding that either 
interpretation is a reasonable interpretation of what statutory cause is. 
136. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 646 (Ct. 
lnt'l Trade 1984), vacated on other grounds sub nom., American Lamb Co. v. 
United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
137. 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1241-43 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). 
138. Cf id. at 1242-43. 
139. For a discussion of Commission investigations that consider unfair 
----
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The CIT also incorrectly claims that the legislative history of 
the 1979 Act was silent on the question of whether the Com-
mission should look at the unfair trade margin. 140 The only 
support for the CIT's holding, other than deference to an 
agency's interpretation, is a 1984 House colloquy discussing 
the rejection of an amendment, by a Congress subsequent to 
the one that enacted Title VII, that would have allowed the 
Commission to base its determination [solely] on the size of 
the unfair trade margin. 141 The amendment was introduced 
to bolster an analytical framework called margins a'halysis, 
whereby the Commission would base its determination 
solely on the size of the unfair trade margin relative to the 
underselling margin. Congress's refusal to endorse margins 
analysis, however, does not imply its endorsement of an all-
imports standard. 
Recently, in Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. 
United States, the CIT reaffirmed its holding that the Commis-
sion is not required to determine that the subsidy injured the 
domestic industry. 142 The CIT's holding in Alberta Pork is 
based on three grounds: (1) the language of the statute, 
which does not require that the Commission find a causal 
connection between the subsidy and injury, 143 (2) the CIT's 
interpretation in Hyundai Pipe that the Subsidies Code does 
not require a causal connection between the subsidy and in-
jury, 144 and (3) the legislative history.I45 
The first two grounds are discussed above. The CIT's 
argument with respect to the legislative history is that there 
is a sufficient link between the subsidization and the injury 
when the subsidized imports cause material injury.I
46 
Ac-
trade margins, see Hyundai Pipe Co. v. U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion, 670 F. Supp. 357, 361 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1987); Palmeter, supra note 
112, at 6-17. 
140. Maine Potato Council, 613 F. Supp. at 1243. For a discussion of the 
legislative history, see supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
141. Maine Potato Council, 613 F. Supp. at 1242-43. 
142. 669 F. Supp. 445, 465-66 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1987). 
143. /d. at 465. 
144. Id. at 466. In both Hyundai Pipe and Alberta Pork the CIT argued 
that the Subsidies Code does not require that the unfair practice cause 
injury because of footnote 4 of the Subsidies Code. Cf supra notes 120-
126 and accompanying text. 
145. Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board, 669 F. Supp. at 465-66. 
146. /d. 
I ,, 
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cording to the CIT, the legislative history can be read to im-
ply that it is sufficient if either the imports or the practice 
causes injury. Essentially, the CIT reads the legislative his-
tory to set up a two-prong test and to require that only one 
of the two prongs be met for the Commission to reach an 
affirmative determination. However, the effect of the im-
ports is always at least as great as the effect of the unfair 
practice. 147 Thus, such an interpretation of the legislative 
~ist<;>ry renders irrelevant all references to the practice caus-
mg IOJUry. 
C. The Role of Economics in Assessing Causation 
The statute requires causation: the unfair practice must 
cause injury. 148 To satisfy this test there must be an actual 
connection, which is a question of economics. 149 Congress 
did not have to require a causal connection. Congress could 
have passed a law requiring that an antidumping duty or 
countervailing duty be imposed wherever certain criteria 
were met. For example, Congress could have passed a law 
requiring that an antidumping or countervailing duty be im-
14 7. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
148. H.R. REP. No. 37, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1979); S. REP. No. 
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979). 
149. Even those who criticize the use of economic analysis in the causa-
tion test and believe that the imports, not the unfair practice, are the ap-
propriate causal factor, concede that there must be a causal connection. 
See, e.g., Eckes, The Interface of Antitrust and Trade Laws- Conflict or Harmony? 
An lTC Commissioner's Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 417, 422 (1987);Jame-
son, supra note 67, at 530-50. Commissioners have frequently disagreed 
on the role of economic analysis in determining whether the statutory cau-
sation standard has been met. For two commissioners' criticisms of the 
use of economics in assessing causation, see Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel 
Plates and Sheets from Argentina, USITC Pub. 1967, Inv. No. 731-TA-
175, at 73, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2295, 2317 ( 1987) (Eckes, Comm'r, dissent-
ing) (final, remand); Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, supra note 68, at 15 
n.58, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1942 n.58 (Rohr, Comm'r), at 52, 8 I.T.R.D. 
(BNA) at 1949 (Eckes, Comm'r). For two commissioners' defenses of their 
use of economics in assessing causation, see Color Picture Tubes from 
Canada, Japan, Korea, and Singapore, USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 731-
TA-367 to -370, at 15-32, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1537, 1542-57 (1987) 
(Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final); Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and 
Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1994, Inv. No. 731-TA-349, at 53-61 
(July 1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final); Oil Country Tubular Goods 
from Israel, USITC Pub. 1840, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-271 and 731-TA-318, at 
21 (Apr. 1986) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary). 
-----~.-
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posed if the Commerce Department finds that dumped or 
subsidized goods are being imported into the United States, 
and the Commission finds that the mean price of the imports 
is below the mean price of the domestic like product and that 
the market share of the imports has increased by at least 5 
percentage points in the last 3 years. Congress, however, 
did not pass such a law, or any similar law, but passed in-
stead a law requiring a causal connection. Once the statute 
is interpreted to require a causal connection, an interpreta-
tion apparently no one has contested, the Commission must 
perform an economic analysis to satisfy the statutory direc-
tive. The importance of economic analysis in reaching eco-
nomic conclusions was recently underscored by the Supreme 
Court in an antitrust case, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 150 in which the Court held that the peti-
tioners' claim of a conspiracy to monopolize the U.S. con-
sumer electronics market through predatory pricing in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act could not survive a mo-
tion for summary judgment because the claim was 
implausible. In recognizing the important role that eco-
nomic analysis plays in antitrust law, the Court stated: 
It follows from these settled principles that if the 
factual context renders respondent's claim implau-
sible-if the claim is one that simply makes no eco-
nomic sense-respondents must come forward with 
more persuasive evidence to support their claim 
than would otherwise be necessary. [First National 
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 
(1968)] is instructive. The issue in that case was 
whether proof of the defendant's refusal to deal 
with the plaintiff supported an inference that the 
defendant willingly had joined an illegal boycott. 
Economic factors strongly suggested that the de-
fendant had no motive to join the alleged conspir-
acy. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the 
defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed 
to create a triable issue. But the refusal to deal had 
to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the de-
fendant lacked any rational motive to join the al-
150. 475 u.s. 574 (1986). 
'. 
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leged boycott, and since its refusal to deal was con-
sistent with the defendant's independent interest, 
the refusal to deal could not by itself support a find-
ing of antitrust liability. 15 1 
The legal importance of economic analysis to a case brought 
under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which 
directly call for an economic analysis, should be at least as 
great as that for a case brought under the Sherman Act, with 
its less specific directive. 
Moreover, once the Commission embarks on an eco-
nomic analysis of the impact of the unfairly traded imports, it 
must perform this analysis properly otherwise it would be 
acting arbitrarily and capriciously. As Judge Wald of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has observed: 
[W]hatever their differences over the soundness of 
particular policies, economists substantially agree 
on certain fundamentals of microeconomic theory. 
In the long run, supply must equal demand; in a 
competitive market, an efficient operator will earn a 
reasonable return on invested capital but no more; 
investors will seek to maximize profits; and so on. 
If, after [a] careful factual inquiry ... ajudge deter-
mines that the agency's analysis is inconsistent with 
basic microeconomics and that the agency has not 
explained (perhaps because it has not noticed) the 
discrepancy, the judge may properly conclude that 
the agency action is arbitrary and capricious. This 
is not to say that an agency cannot reject the pre-
vailing economic wisdom, but courts can properly 
insist that the agency do so consciously and explain 
why it chose to rely on an unorthodox theory. 152 
The proposed economic approach to causation is the 
151. /d. at 587. 
152. Wald, supra note 11, at 51-52 (footnotes omitted). Judge Wald's 
statement addresses the standard of review a court should use in reviewing 
an agency's choice of policy. As Judge Wald admits, an agency has less 
discretion when the statute requires specific findings of certain economic 
facts. /d. at 49. As a consequence, an agency may never appropriately 
reject fundamental economic theory when it is making a finding of an eco-
nomic fact. 
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proper way to assess causation because it phrases the ques-
tion the Commission must address in every investigation in a 
way that is capable of satisfYing the statutory standard and 
because it uses basic microeconomics to answer that ques-
tion. The economic approach to causation is capable of de-
termining whether the unfair practice has injured the domes-
tic industry because it uses counterfactuals, assessing causa-
tion by comparing the state the industry is in now with the 
state the industry would be in but for the unfair practice. If 
the domestic industry would be materially better off but for 
the unfair practice, then the unfair practice has materially in-
jured the domestic industry. In addition to posing the 
proper question, the economic approach can answer this 
question because it explicitly uses economic theory to esti-
mate'the economic impact of the unfair practice on the do-
mestic industry. 153 
In the last few years several commissioners have unfor-
tunately tended to reject economic analysis in favor of a so-
called examination of the facts. 154 The Commission is re-
quired to make an economic inquiry about cause and effect. 
In any investigation, the parties present arguments to the 
Commission, marshal facts, and interpret these facts to sup-
port their positions. The critical step in any investigation is 
153. On several occasions the CIT has held that the Commission can use 
economic elasticity estimates to make its statutory determination. See, e.g., 
Maverick Tube Corp. V; United States, 687 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (Ct. lnt'1 
Trade 1988); Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. United States, 
683 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); USX Corp. v. United 
States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 69 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1988); Alberta Pork Producers' 
Marketing Board v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 445, 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1987). 
154. See, e.g., Sewn Cloth Headwear from the People's Republic of 
China, USITC Pub. 2096, Inv. No. 731-TA-405, at 17-38 (July 1988) 
(Eckes, Comm'r) (preliminary); Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC 
Pub. 2108, lnv. No. 701-TA-224, at 10-13 (Aug. 1988) (Rohr, Comm'r) 
(final, remand); Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1818, Inv. 
Nos. 701-TA-239 and 731-TA-248, at 52, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1949 (1986) 
(Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) ("The statute is generally clear, and those of 
us charged with administering it have no business substituting academic 
fictions for the factual record and our own judgment.") (final); id. at 15 
n.58 ("Commissioner Rohr disassociates himself from this analysis of elas-
ticity. He has based his analysis on the actual facts of these investigations 
with respect to prices rather than what theory states might or should be 
occurring."). 
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the interpretation of data. 155 Some theories or concepts 
must underlie this analysis, even if in aggregate they go by 
the name of common sense. The trouble, and cause for con-
cern, is that an "examination of facts" and "common sense 
interpretations" often mask nonsensical assumptions and in-
valid concepts. 156 As scientists and philosophers of science 
have long realized, a correct theory is of substantial practical 
value, whereas isolated facts or anecdotes are of little use: 
The plain man-1 do not think this is an over-
statement-calls a "theory" anything he does not 
understand, especially if the conclusions it is used 
to support are distasteful to him. . . . It is only be-
cause he does not understand "theory" that the 
plain man is apt to compare it unfavorably with 
"practice," by which he means what he can under-
stand .... 
The practical man is apt to sneer at the theo-
rist; but an examination of any of his most firmly-
rooted prejudices would show at once that he him-
self is as much a theorist as the purest and most aca-
demic student; theory is a necessary instrument of 
thought in disentangling the amazingly complex re-
155. As Commissioner Liebeler has noted: "Precise analytical tools sub-
stitute not for the law, but for seat-of-the-pants judgments about which 
data are more important in a particular case." Oil Country Tubular Goods 
from Israel, USITC Pub. 1840, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-271 and 731-TA-318, at 
21 (Apr. 1986) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary) (footnote omitted). 
See also Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, Korea, and Singapore, 
USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-367 to -370, at 15-32, 10 I.T.R.D. 
(BNA) at 1542-57 (1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final); Certain 
Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1994, 
Inv. No. 731-TA-349, at 53-61 (July 1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (fi-
nal). 
156. The response that the statute requires a legal conclusion that there 
is a causal connection rather than an economic conclusion begs the ques-
tion. Title VII requires a causal connection, which is fundamentally an 
economic issue. To say, however, that a legal cause is a broader notion 
than an economic cause is inconsistent with the notion of causation. An 
analogy to tort law is instructive. In torts, with very few exceptions, the set 
of legal causes is a subset of the set of causes-in-fact. See W. PRosSER, LAw 
OF TORTS 236-41 (4th ed. 1971). By analogy, causation for the purposes 
ofTitle VII cannot extend beyond actual causation. To my knowledge, no 
one has suggestedcthat Title VII does not require an actual causal connec-
tion. 
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lations of the external world. But while his theories 
are false because he never tests them properly, the 
theories of science are continually under constant 
test and only survive if they are true. It is the practi-
cal man and not the student of pure science who is 
guilty of relying on extravagant speculation, un-
checked by comparison with solid fact. 157 
97 
As is shown in the next section, the traditional approach is 
based on theories that are inconsistent with basic 
microeconomics and that are without empirical support. 
D. Summary 
This section has advanced three broad arguments: ( 1) 
that the Commission should make a unitary determination; 
(2) that the unfair practice is the proper causal factor; and (3) 
that there must be a causal connection. There is authority 
supporting all three arguments. The first two are purely ar-
guments of statutory interpretation. The authority support-
ing the first argument is overwhelming. There is no support 
for bifurcating the determination, and such an approach 
should never have been upheld on review. The second argu-
ment is more problematic. Although the unfair practice in-
terpretation is the stronger, there is authority for both inter-
pretations. Given the deference usually granted to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with ad-
ministering, a commissioner's choice of either causal factor 
should probably be upheld on review, as the CIT has done, 
albeit on questionable grounds. The crucial third argument, 
like the first two, concerns the interpretation of a statute. 
However, its ramifications extend beyond the statute and its 
interpretation. Since the statute requires a causal connec-
tion, the use of economic analysis to assess causation is a 
valid exercise of a commissioner's discretion. 
157. L. YEAGER & D. TUERCK, FoREIGN TRADE AND U.S. POLICY: THE 
CASE FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 119-20 (1976) (quoting N. CAMP-
BELL, WHAT IS SCIENCE? 181, 174 (1952)). See also j. KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1936). For one econ-
omist's view on the usefulness of anecdotal evidence in economics, see G. 
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 17 (3d ed. 1966). 
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VI. CRITICISM OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
TO CAUSATION 
Because Congress has charged the Commission with in-
terpreting Title VII, the CIT, in reviewing the Commission's 
opinions, will accord substantial weight to the Commission's 
interpretation of the statute .I 5 8 The Commission's interpre-
tation will be upheld if it is sufficiently reasonable and not 
inconsistent with clear legislative intent. 159 The Commis-
sion's interpretation need not be the best or the one that the 
court would have chosen, as long as it is reasonable. 16o The 
Commission's finding that a particular domestic industry is 
or is not materially injured, however, will be upheld if it is 
supported by substantial evidence on the record. 16 1 More-
over, for its determination to be upheld, the Commission 
must supply an analysis of how the factors it relied on sup-
port its determination. 162 The Commission must articulate 
the rational connection between the factors it is relying on 
and its ultimate determination. 163 Thus, to be properly up-
held, the Commission's traditional analysis of causation must 
be consistent with basic microeconomic principles. If it is 
not, the Commission cannot be said to have provided a ra-
tional basis for its conclusion. 
This section will demonstrate that the Commission's 
traditional three-factor analysis of causation is inconsistent 
158. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-51 
(1978). 
159. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
160. Id.; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.ll reh 'g denied sub. nom. American Iron and 
Steel Institute v. National Resources Defense Council, 468 U.S. 1227 
(1984). 
161. American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 
1276 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), ajf'd sub nom., Armco, Inc. v. United States, 
760 F.2d 250 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B), as amended by Trade Bill, supra note 53, 
§ 1328; USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487,490 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1987) (citing SCM Corp. v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 911, 913 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1981)). 
163. USX Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 490; see also Budd Co. Railway Division 
v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980) (citing 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947)). 
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with basic principles of elementary economic analysis. More-
over, the statutory language does not save the traditional 
analysis of causation. Thus, the traditional analysis should 
be struck down by the Commission's reviewing courts. 
A. Underselling 
Underselling is the first factor on which the Commission 
traditionally relies. Underselling, which is considered to be 
evidence of causation, occurs when the mean price of the im-
ported product is below the mean price of the domestic like 
product. The unstated assumption underlying the Commis-
sion's analysis of underselling is that consumers facing a 
choice between two substitutes will always purchase the less 
expensive product. A simple comparison of market prices 
would be useful for assessing causation only if consumers be-
haved this way. But the Commission's use of underselling is 
inconsistent with the notion of market equilibrium and with 
the observation that imperfect substitutes often sell for dif-
ferent prices. For two substitutes to sell in the same market 
at different prices, any differences in quality or in the terms 
of sale must equal the difference in the price of the two prod-
ucts for the marginal consumer. 164 If this were not true, only 
one of the goods would sell in the market. 
Commission investigations have involved many different 
kinds of products. In some cases there are important physi-
cal differences between the imported and domestic products, 
in other cases there are quality differences, and in still other 
cases there are differences in the terms of sale. 165 Compar-
ing the price of the imported product to the price of the do-
164. If one assumes that the domestic like product is more expensive 
than the imported product such that there would be underselling, the pur-
chasers of the imported product would be those who find the imported 
product to be the better value, while the purchasers of the domestic like 
product would be those who find the like product to be the better value. 
165. See, e.g., Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate from Taiwan, 
USITC Pub. 2032, lnv. No. 731-TA-371, at 12, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1473-
74 (1987) (final) (quality of domestic product exceeds quality of imported 
product); Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan, 
USITC Pub. 1994, lnv. No. 731-TA-349, at 64-65 Ouly 1987) (Brunsdale, 
V. Chairman) (final) (lead time greater for imported than for domestic 
product, which accounts for a five to ten percent price difference); Grand 
and Upright Pianos from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1599, lnv. 
No. 731-TA-204 (Nov. 1984) (preliminary) (physical differences). 
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mestic like product, without accounting for such differences, 
is meaningless. Admittedly, prices are important to the 
Commission's causation analysis. By reducing the relative 
price of the imported article, a subsidy will cause some con-
sumers to shift to the imported product. It will also cause 
domestic producers to reduce the price of the competing do-
mestic like product. Thus, a subsidy will cause both a reduc-
tion in the output of the competing domestic industry and a 
decline in the price of the like product. These effects, how-
ever, are wholly unrelated to which product undersells the 
other. 
The Commission has attempted to justify its under-
selling analysis by relying on the statutory reference to price 
undercutting. As a matter of pure statutory interpretation, 
the traditional underselling analysis would be unobjection-
able. The shortcoming is that the Commission has never ex-
plained how its use of underselling is helpful in assessing 
causation. 
The Commission's traditional use of underselling is not 
saved by a provision in the Trade Bill that replaces the 
phrase "price undercutting" with the phrase "price under-
selling."166 The legislative history states that the statute was 
amended to make clear that evidence of predatory pricing is 
not required; there is no suggestion that Congress was ap-
proving any particular approach when it passed this amend-
ment.167 
Congress provided little guidance as to what it meant by 
the phrase "significant price undercutting."168 On the other 
hand, Congress provided the Commission with substantial 
discretion to make its determinations. 169 This discretion, 
however, is not unlimited. The Commission must assess 
whether there is injury by reason of the unfairly traded im-
ports and not simply whether the imports undersell the do-
mestic like product. Any consideration of underselling must 
assist the Commission in assessing causation. In addition, 
166. Trade Bill, supra note 53, § 1328. 
167. H.R. CoNG. REP. No. 576, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 617, reprinted in 
1988 U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 1547, 1649-51. 
168. See Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1988). 
169. Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). 
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the Commission must articulate how the factors it relies on, 
including underselling, support its determination. 170 
Two CIT cases involvitlg underselling are informative. 
In British Steel Corp. v. United States, 171 plaintiff, British Steel, 
argued that the Commission failed to consider that the costs 
incurred by its customers because of long lead times offset 
the effect of British Steel's lower prices. The CIT held that 
the Commission's analysis was appropriate because the stat-
ute does not authorize the Commission to make adjustments 
for cost factors. In Maine Potato Council v. United States,I72 
plaintiff, Maine Potato Council, argued that the Commission 
in reaching its negative determination did not account for 
the higher quality of Canadian potatoes in evaluating under-
selling, price suppression, and lost sales. In remanding the 
case, the CIT directed the Commission to take into account 
quality differences. 173 The two cases represent different ap-
proaches. British Steel is a mechanical approach to the factors 
listed by the statute. Maine Potato Council is a less mechanical, 
more analytical approach, but it does not go far enough. 
More recently, in Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States, 1' 4 
the CIT, in upholding the negative determinations of two 
commissioners who adhered to the traditional approach, 
stated that it was proper for the commissioners "to go be-
yond merely identifying the presence of underselling to con-
sider whether that underselling is significant in determining 
whether there is a causal nexus between imports and in-
jury.''175 The CIT should take a hard look at the Commis-
sion's use of underselling. It should address the question 
whether a simple comparison of mean prices is probative of 
causation. Because such a simple comparison is not proof of 
causation, the CIT should reverse decisions that rely on sim-
ple comparisons because such comparisons are not in ac-
cordance with the law. 
In dealing with underselling, the CIT should recognize 
that dumping and subsidization injure the domestic industry 
170. Trade Bill, supra note 53, § 1328; see USX Corp. v. United States, 
655 F. Supp. 487, 490 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). 
171. 593 F. Supp. 405,412 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
172. 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1245-46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). 
173. /d. at 1246. 
174. 687 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). 
175. /d. at 1579. 
l 
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by lowering the price of the imported product and that com-
peting domestic producers will react to a lower price for the 
imported product either by lowering their prices or by mak-
ing fewer sales, or both. That the average price of the im-
ported product is below the average price of the domestic 
like product suggests that producers of the like product may 
not have responded to the unfair practice by lowering their 
prices. If domestic producers have not reduced their prices 
by as much as the importers have, they may be losing sales to 
imports because the unfair trade practice has resulted in a 
fall in the relative price of the imported article. If the Com-
mission chooses to use underselling instead of directly ad-
dressing the question whether the unfair practice has led to a 
reduction in sales by the domestic industry, the CIT should 
require that the Commission still assess whether the domes-
tic producers have actually had a reduction in sales because 
of a fall in the relative price of the imported product. The 
CIT should not allow the Commission to base an affirmative 
determination on the mere existence of underselling. Such 
an approach raises evidence of underselling from its proper 
role as a signpost in the investigation beyond the role of an 
indicium of injury to the level of the ultimate statutory find-
ing,I76 
In contrast to the above use of evidence of underselling, 
the Commission's analysis of underselling is inconsistent 
with basic microeconomics. This inconsistency has been 
brought to its attention many times, 177 yet the Commission 
176. Worth noting is that the commissioners who use the traditional un-
derselling analysis also advocate an all-imports standard, while those who 
are critical of the traditional use of underselling advocate an unfair-prac-
tice standard. Interestingly, the pricing of the imports is irrelevant if an 
all-imports standard is used. If the causal factor is the imports, then the 
question is how much better the domestic industry would be if the unfair 
imports were excluded. How any information about the price of the im-
ports relative to the price of the like product would help to answer this 
question is unclear. 
Alternatively, if the causal factor is the unfair trade practice, the 
proper question is how much better the domestic industry would be if the 
imports were fairly priced. In this case, because the counterfactual does 
not exclude the imports but simply raises their prices, information about 
the relative price of the imports would be useful. Consequently, the price 
of the imports is relevant when the unfair practice standard is used, but 
not when the all-imports standard is used. 
177. See, e.g., Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thai-
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continues to base its determination on the presence or ab-
sence of underselling, merely referring to the language on 
price undercutting. 178 Such reliance on underselling should 
therefore amount to reversible error.t 79 
B. Lost Sales 
The second factor that the Commission traditionally em-
phasizes is lost sales. The sales lost as a result of the unfair 
practice are an important element of the injury caused by the 
unfair practice. The total sales that would have been made 
but for the unfair practice are calculated by taking the differ-
ence between the reduction in domestic sales resulting from 
the decline in the price of the imports given the price of the 
like product and the increase in domestic sales resulting 
from the decline in the price of the like product. In addition, 
the number of lost sales cannot be greater than the addi-
tional imports resulting from the unfair practice. 
To assess the number of lost sales through a survey 
would be extremely difficult. To make such an assessment, 
the Commission would have to obtain a random sample of 
purchasers and ask each purchaser the following question: 
Would you have purchased the imported product or the do-
mestic like product if the price of the imported product were 
its unsubsidized price and the price of the like product were 
its fairly-traded price? Assuming that the two unobserved 
prices were known to the questioner when he asked the 
question and that the respondents' answers were reliable, 
then the total sales lost as a result of the unfair practice could 
be calculated using the survey and current market-share 
data. 
land and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1680, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-242 and 731-
TA-252, -253, at 26 n.7 (Apr. 1985) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary); 
Certain Table Wine from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and 
Italy, USITC Pub. 1771, lnv. Nos. 701-TA-258 to -260 and 731-TA-283 to 
-285, at 34-36, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2657-59 (1985) (Liebeler, V. Chair-
man) (preliminary); Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from 
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936, Inv. Nos. 701-T A-
267, -268 and 731-TA-304, -305, at 34 n.23, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1771 
n.23 (1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final). 
178. See, e.g., Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1818, lnv. 
Nos. 701-TA-239 and 731-TA-248, at 43-44, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1951-52 
(1986) (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (final). 
179. See supra notes f47-56 and 158-63, and accompanying text. 
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There is no reason to expect that the anecdotal lost sales 
information collected by the Commission should approxi-
mate the number of lost sales. One reason to be skeptical 
about the Commission's lost-sales data is that the Commis-
sion asks the wrong questions. It is not clear what it means 
when a consumer responds affirmatively to the question of 
whether price was an important consideration in choosing 
which product to purchase. An affirmative answer probably 
means that the goods are close substitutes, so the purchase 
decision can be affected by small changes in relative price. 
Whether two goods are close substitutes, however, is not the 
same as saying that a subsidy caused a consumer to shift his 
purchase from the domestic product to the imported prod-
uct. ISO 
There are two more reasons to be skeptical about the 
Commission's use of lost sales data. First, the Commission 
does not use proper sampling and statistical techniques.l 81 
Thus, there is no way to generalize from the Commission's 
sample about the entire market. Second, there are problems 
with using interviews to elicit how consumers really would 
have acted in the marketplace had different prices pre-
vailed.182 
The CIT does not require that the traditional lost-sales 
analysis be used. There is no statutory language that sug-
gests that the Commission perform such an analysis, 183 and 
on several occasions the CIT has explicitly held that there is 
no such requirement. 184 In addition, the CIT has actually 
180. The Commission's traditional lost-sales analysis is even more 
troublesome in connection with an all-imports standard. When the im-
ports are the causal factor, the proper question is how much better off the 
domestic industry would be if all the imports were excluded from the mar-
ket. The reasons a consumer gave for purchasing the imported product 
would matter little to answer this question. Whether the consumer would 
buy the domestic article if the imported article were not available is the 
only relevant question. · 
181. See E. Easton, supra note 56, at 15. 
182. See Jameson, supra note 67, at 534 (consumers have an economic 
incentive to say that their purchases were not lost sales because they are 
harmed by duties); E. Easton, supra note 56, at 25-26 (results of surveys 
sensitive to how interviewer phrases the questions). 
183. See Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 577, 586 
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). 
184. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 572 
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been critical of the Commission's use oflost-sales data where 
fungible goods are involved, noting that in such an instance 
volume may be a better indicator of the sales actually lost. 185 
Thus, for the Commission's lost-sales analysis to be upheld, 
it must be rationally related to causation, 186 which it is not. 
To the contrary, the Commission frequently has been ap-
prised of the weaknesses of its lost-sales analysis. 18 7 Yet the 
Commission continues to use this analysis. 188 Consequently, 
the CIT should reject the Commission's traditional lost-sales 
analysis. 189 
C. Trends and Correlations 
The third factor that the Commission traditionally em-' 
phasizes is import trends. The Commission has looked for 
trends in the volume and market penetration of the imports 
under investigation and correlations between those trends 
and various indicia of the health of the industry. The exist-
ence of a trend in the quantity and market penetration of the 
imports over time is of questionable relevance. That imports 
are increasing says nothing about the effect of the unfair 
practice because imports may be increasing for a variety of 
reasons that have nothing to do with the unfair practice. Al-
ternatively, treating the imports as the causal factor, it is not 
clear why the trend in imports, and not the level of imports, 
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Gifford-Hill Cement, 615 F. Supp. at 585-86; Maine 
Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1985). 
185. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill Cement, 615 F. Supp. at 586. 
186. See Lone Star Steel Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 183, 186 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1986) ("[I]nstances of lost sales alone do not inandate a find-
ing of injury; rather it is for ITC to determine whether lost sales, together 
with other factors, indicate a causal nexus between LTFV imports and ma-
terial injury to the domestic industry."). 
187. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill Cement, 615 F. Supp. at 586 ("Where fungible 
goods are concerned, volume may be the best indicator of lost sales rather 
than the anecdotal evidence obtained in the typical lost sales study." (foot-
note omitted)); Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes 
and Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 12 
n.28, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1782 n.28 (1986) (Stem, Chairwoman, Liebeler, 
V. Chairman, & Brunsdale, Comm'r) (final). 
188. See, e.g., Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and 
Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269 and 731-TA-311, -312, 
-315, at 15,9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1706 (1986) (final). 
189. See supra notes 14 7-56 and 158-63, and accompanying text. 
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would be relevant. For under this formulation of the statu-
tory test, it is the imports and not the increase in imports 
that is the statutory cause.l90 
The Commission's use of correlation analysis is also on 
a shaky foundation. Any decline in the fortunes of an indus-
try over time can be attributable to a single unfair practice 
only if two conditions hold. First, the imports must not have 
been dumped or subsidized at the benchmark date. Second, 
since the benchmark date there must have been no changes 
other than the introduction of the dumping or the subsidy 
that have affected the industry. If these two conditions do 
not hold, there would be no reason to expect that any de-
cline in the condition of the industry could be attributed to 
the unfair practice and not to any other cause. Unfortu-
nately, the Commission looks for a correlation between im-
ports and various indicia of the condition of the industry in 
just about every case, without any attempt to ensure that 
these two conditions are met. 191 
When the Commission relies on correlation analysis to 
make its determination, there is a chance that it will make a 
negative determination even though the impact of the unfair 
practice is material, because the adverse impact of the unfair 
practice may be outweighed by the positive impact of other 
causes, such as a decline in input prices or an increase in 
demand. Alternatively, the Commission might make an af-
firmative determination even when the impact of the unfair 
practice is not material, because other causes may have had a 
materially adverse impact on the domestic industry. An ad-
ditional problem with the use of import trends and correla-
190. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 
(1982)), which implements the GATT Escape Clause, empowers the Com-
mission to make a recommendation to the President for relief if an in-
crease in imports is a substantial cause of serious injury to a competing 
domestic industry. Title VII, however, is concerned with dumping and 
subsidies, not increased imports. 
191. Treating the imports as the causal factor, correlation analysis is ap-
propriate only if there were, first, no imports at the benchmark date, and 
second, no changes affecting the domestic industry after the benchmark 
date that could be attributed to causes other than the imports. The first 
condition can be corrected by extrapolation if the level of imports at the 
benchmark date is known. The second condition, however, cannot be ig-
nored, nor can it be corrected by simple extrapolation. It undermines any 
determination based on correlations, regardless of the causal factor. 
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tion analysis is that they implicitly assume that the domestic 
industry was not materially injured by reason of unfair im-
ports at the benchmark date. For example, the industry 
might have been materially injured by reason of unfair im-
ports at the benchmark date, and there might have been no 
change in the condition of the industry or the market pene-
tration of the imports since that date. In such a case, the 
Commission should make an affirmative determination, but 
an examination of trends or correlation analysis would sug-
gest otherwise. 
The statute does not support the Commission's tradi-
tional use of trends and correlations. Although the statute 
suggests that the Commission look at various trends, this 
does not imply that a trend or correlation by itself is evi-
dence of a causal connection. For the Commission's use of 
trends and correlations to be upheld, it still must be ration-
ally related to causation. This it is not. The shortcomings of 
the Commission's analysis of trends have been brought to its 
attention, 192 yet the Commission's reliance on trends contin-
ues. Consequently, the CIT should reject the Commission's 
traditional analysis of trends.I93 
D. Summary 
The Commission has traditionally emphasized three 
kinds of data in assessing causation, each one of which is 
based on economic misconceptions. The Commission's 
analysis of causation is thus seriously flawed, and its conclu-
sions are probably often wrong. 194 Moreover, the traditional 
approach cannot be saved by an appeal to the statutory lan-
guage. Therefore, because the Commission's traditional ap-
proach to causation cannot assess the economic impact that 
either the unfair practice or the imports have had on the do-
mestic industry, the Commissioners who use it do not have a 
proper base on which to render a judgment whether the do-
mestic industry has been materially injured by reason of the 
192. Nitrile Rubber from Japan, USITC Pub. 2090, lnv. No. 731-TA-
384, at 32-37 (June 1988) (Cass, Comm'r) (final). 
193. See supra notes 147-56 and 158-63, and accompanying text. 
194. In addition to the conceptual problems with the Commission's cau-
sation analysis, there are serious problems with the data that the Commis-
sion collects and analyzes. For a critique of the Commission's data collec-
tion procedures, see E. Easton, supra note 56, at 14-26. 
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imports. Therefore, the traditional approach should be 
struck down by the Commission's reviewing courts. 
VII. THE MEASUREMENT OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICE 
Even if the Commission wanted to, it would be difficult 
for it to apply precisely the proposed economic approach to 
injury in every investigation. This is because there are sub-
stantial problems with the Commerce Department's mea-
surement of the dumping and subsidy margins that would 
make it difficult to implement an analytically correct frame-
work for determining injury. As calculated by the Commerce 
Department, the dumping and subsidy margins contain bi-
ases that generally, but not always, overestimate the size of 
the unfair practice. 195 Therefore, if the Commission were to 
use the Commerce Department's calculations of the dump-
ing and subsidy margins in its own investigations as esti-
mates of the shifts in the import supply curves, the Commis-
sion would generally be led to overestimate the injury caused 
by the unfair practice. A discussion of the biases in the Com-
merce Department's calculation of subsidy and dumping 
margins follows. 
A. Subsidy Margins 
A subsidy injures competing domestic producers by 
driving down the import supply curve; the injury to U.S. pro-
ducers from a subsidy depends, in part, on the size of this 
shift. The purpose of the countervailing duty law is to pro-
tect competing domestic producers from the adverse effects 
of the subsidy, and the impact of the subsidy depends not on 
the size of the subsidy but on the size of the shift in the im-
port supply curve. Thus, the theoretically correct way to 
measure a subsidy is by the shift in the import supply 
195. For a discussion of statistical biases in the Commerce Department's 
calculation of dumping margins, see R. Boltuck, Creative Statistics: Biases 
in the Commerce Department's Calculation of Dumping Margins (July 10, 
1987) (available in the author's file at the offices of the journal of Interna-
tional Law and Politics, New York University School of Law); seeR. Diamond, 
A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of 
U.S. Countervailing Duty Law (March 23, 1990) (available in the author's 
file at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York 
University School of Law). 
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curve. 196 The Commerce Department, however, does not 
measure a subsidy by the shift in the import supply curve, 
but by the value of the subsidy to the recipient. 197 In the 
case of a subsidy that is fully passed through, these two 
measures will be the same, but with other subsidies they will 
differ. For example, for a subsidy to a factor of production, 
which induces substitution in favor of that factor, the amount 
of the subsidy exceeds the shift in the import supply 
curve. 198 For a nonrecurring subsidy, such as a loan guaran-
tee, it would be very difficult to determine what, if any, effect 
the subsidy has had on the import supply curve. In such 
cases, Congress has directed that the Commerce Department 
allocate the value of the net subsidy over time on the basis of 
the commercial and competitive benefit to the recipient. 199 
Nonetheless, the value of the net subsidy, however allocated 
over time, may have no relation to the impact of the subsidy 
on the import supply curve. 
There is a practical reason for measuring a subsidy by its 
value to the recipient. In many cases it would be very diffi-
cult for the Commerce Department to ascertain how the sub-
sidy has affected the import supply curve. Such an assess-
ment would be especially difficult with subsidized imports 
from countries where there is so close a relationship between 
government and industry that government policies are car-
ried out through consensus and persuasion instead of 
through regulation and litigation. In such an instance, it 
would be difficult to know how the subsidy affected the recip-
196. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 77, at 21-25. See also supra 
notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
197. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a)(1), 1677(5), (6) (1982). Congress rejected 
the idea that the indirect costs of a subsidy to a firm, such as the higher 
freight costs of moving to a disadvantaged area, could be used to offset the 
size ofthe subsidy. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1979); S. 
REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 471-72. 
198. Memorandum from Industry Economist, supra note 41, at 2-3. See 
also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
199. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979); S. REP. No. 
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 381, 471-72. For a general discussion of the use of loans as 
subsidies, see Jameson, The Administration of U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws 
with Regard to Domestic Subsidies, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 59, 110-18 
(1985), and Sandler, supra note 18, at 770-71. 
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ient's production and exports to the United States. In addi-
tion, such an approach would encourage foreign govern-
ments and producers to claim that the subsidy did not shift 
the recipient's excess supply curve to the United States, but 
instead was used to defray the recipient's fixed costs of pro-
duction. In conclusion, other than for practical reasons of 
measurement, it is difficult to find a theoretical reason for 
measuring a subsidy by its size instead of by its effect on the 
import supply curve. Nonetheless, in spite of the logically 
weak foundation on which it is based, the Commerce Depart-
ment measures a subsidy not by its effect on the import sup-
ply curve, but by its value to the recipient. 
B. Dumping Margins 
There are also substantial problems with the measure-
ment of dumping margins. However, unlike with subsidies, 
where an analytically incorrect definition of the magnitude of 
the subsidy is called for by Congress, the calculation of 
dumping margins is filled with computational biases intro-
duced by the Commerce Department that tend to increase 
the margins. 
The statute and legislative history provide little gui-
dance on how to measure dumping, thereby leaving the 
Commerce Department largely on its own. The method de-
veloped by the Commerce Department to calculate a dump-
ing margin is as follows. The Commerce Department begins 
its calculation of the dumping margin with the foreign pro-
ducer's cost of production. Sales at prices above the foreign 
producer's total cost of production are used to determine 
the fair value of the product, 200 which is just the mean of 
200. The statute directs Commerce to exclude sales made at prices that 
would not permit the recovery of all costs within a reasonable time in the 
ordinary course of trade if such sales have been made over an extended 
period of time and in substantial quantities. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982); 
19 C.F .R. § 353.51 (a) ( 1989). If there are insufficient sales above the pro-
ducer's full cost of production, then Commerce will calculate fair value by 
using third country sales or a constructed value. For a discussion of the 
different methods Commerce uses to calculate fair value, see Kaplan, 
Kamarack, & Parker, Cost Analysis Under the Antidumping Law, 3 G.W J. Int'l 
L. & Econ. 357 (1988); Bryan & Boursereau, Antidumping Law in the Euro-
pean Communities and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 18 J. INT'L L. & 
EcoN. 631, 670-76 (1985). 
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such sales. Each individual U.S. sale is compared to this 
mean. Sales at prices below this mean are assessed an 
amount less than fair value ("L TFV"). Sales at prices above 
the mean are assessed an amount L TFV of zero. The mean 
value of the resulting L TFV amounts expressed as a percent-
age of the mean price of all U.S. sales constitutes the dump-
ing margin.201 The dumping margin as so calculated over-
states the amount of price discrimination between the ex-
porter's home market and the U.S. market because of the 
exclusion of some home market sales and because of the un-
usual averaging technique.2o2 
Furthermore, putting to one side the computational dif-
ficulties in the calculation of dumping margins, injury to an 
industry caused by dumping remains very difficult to define. 
Unlike a subsidy, where there is generally a direct relation-
ship between the size of the subsidy and the size of the in-
jury, no such relationship exists between dumping and in-
jury. Dumping, as previously described, most commonly 
takes the form of price discrimination, 203 and a higher home-
market price may have no effect on the competing U.S. in-
dustry.204 Even so, the statutory directive-that the Com-
mission determine whether the domestic industry is injured 
by the dumping-requires that the Commission use some 
kind of injury test. 
Title VII defines dumping as sales in the United States 
of merchandise at less than fair value. Fair value is the price 
in the home market of merchandise that is similar to the mer-
chandise alleged to be dumped in the United States. Thus, 
one way for the Commission to carry out the Congressional 
directive would he to measure the injury from dumping by 
how much better off the domestic industry would be if the 
201. See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 6, at 506; Sandler, supra note 
18, at 763-65. 
202. Although Title VII authorizes Commerce to use statistically proper 
averaging and sampling techniques, Commerce has generally declined to 
use proper statistical techniques in its calculation of dumping margins. It 
has also mechanically excluded sales made at less than the cost of produc-
tion from the calculation of foreign market value without properly consid-
ering product development cycles or demand cycles. 
203. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
204. See Boltuck, supra note 26, at 48-50; Knoll, United States Antidumping 
Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX. INT'L LJ. 265, 285-87 (1987). 
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foreign producers were constrained to sell their product in 
the United States at the then prevailing fair value. Using 
such. an injury test, and ignoring the Commerce Depart-
ment's computational errors, is equivalent to asking how 
much better off the domestic industry would be if the U.S. 
price of the dumped imports were increased to eliminate the 
price discrimination. 
It is worth noting that an antidumping duty may not en-
tirely eliminate the effect of selling at less than fair value 
when the foreign producers under investigation are engag-
ing in price discrimination. The remedy afforded by Title 
VII is an antidumping duty equal to the margin of dump-
ing. 205 The amount of the duty is calculated at the end of the 
year for all of the sales made in the preceding year.206 Thus, 
a foreign manufacturer can reduce the duty it will pay either 
by increasing its U.S. price or by decreasing its home-market 
price. In general, an antidumping duty will completely inte-
grate the two markets and will cause each affected foreign 
producer engaging in price discrimination to raise its U.S. 
price and lower its home-market price. Each producer's re-
sulting after-tariff price will lie between the producer's initial 
U.S. and home-market prices. Thus, the imposition of an an-
tidumping duty will not cause the affected foreign producer 
to raise its U.S. price to the original "fair value," but to raise 
its U.S. price to a lesser amount and lower its home-market 
price to that same amount. Thus, a second way to measure 
the injury from dumping is by comparing the current state of 
the industry to the state the industry would be in if relief 
were granted and the U.S. and home markets were inte-
grated.207 When such an approach is used (and ignoring the 
statistical biases inherent in the Commerce Department's 
method of calculating dumping margins), the amount of 
205. 19 u.s.c. § 1673 (1982). 
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.53, 355.41 (1988). 
An importer of merchandise subject to an outstanding antidumping or 
countervailing duty order is required to make a deposit covering the esti-
mated antidumping or countervailing duty. 19 U.S.C. § 167l(e)(a)(3) 
(1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.48(a)(3), 355.36(c) (1988). 
207. See Boltuck, supra note 26, at 48-50. This is the comparison that the 
Comparative Analysis of the Domestic Industry Condition or CADIC 
model makes. This model was developed by Richard Boltuck of the Com-
mission's Office of Economics, and its results are reported to the Commis-
sion in every antidumping and countervailing duty investigation. 
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price discrimination will exceed the effect an antidumping 
duty would have on the U.S. price of the imported product. 
C. Estimating the Effect of the Unfair Practice on the Import 
Supply Curve 
In Section II.B., I said that this Article would concen-
trate on full pass-through subsidies because the proposed 
economic approach to causation works exactly only for such 
subsidies, assuming that the Commission is constrained to 
use the Commerce Department's calculation of the magni-
tude of the unfair practice for its estimate of the effect the 
unfair practice has had on the import supply curve. This is 
because only the Commerce Department's calculation of the 
size of such a subsidy is an economically correct calculation 
of the effect of the unfair practice on the import supply 
curve. Although the Commerce Department's calculation of 
a dumping or subsidy margin will be used to calculate any 
offsetting duty, it is less clear that the Commission is con-
strained to use the Commerce Department's margin calcula-
tion without modification in its injury determination as an 
estimate of the effect the unfair practice has had on the im-
port supply curve. Historically, the Commission has been 
unwilling to modify the Commerce Department's calcula-
tions to estimate the effect of the unfair trade practice on the 
import supply curve.2°8 Even so, there are arguments to be 
made that the Commission should not blindly accept the 
Commerce Department's margins calculations as an estimate 
of the shift caused by the unfair trade practice. 
Congress requires the Commission to assess the impact 
of the dumping or subsidy.209 To comply with this directive, 
the Commission will have to calculate the effect of the unfair 
practice on the import supply curve. Nowhere is the Com-
mission told that it cannot make this calculation simply be-
cause a separate agency, the Commerce Department, must 
calculate the antidumping and countervailing duty margins. 
208. See Memorandum from the General Counsel, supra note 63, at 9. 
But see New Steel Rails from Canada, USITC Pub. 2217, Inv. No. 701-TA-
297 & 731-TA-422, at 185-89 (Sept. 1989) (Cass, V. Chairman, dissent) 
(final) (Commission constrained to accept dumping margin as measure of 
dumping but not as measure of price discrimination). 
209. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text. 
ll4 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 22:37 
To the contrary, the legislative history from the Customs 
Simplification Act of 1954 indicates that the antidumping in-
. jury determination was transferred from the Treasury, which 
at the time also calculated dumping margins, because such 
determinations were similar to those made by the Commis-
sion under another statute and because Treasury was not 
staffed to make such determinations.210 Moreover, Title VII 
provides that the Commerce Department is to make available 
to the Commission the information that it has gathered.211 
If the Commission can calculate the effect the unfair practice 
has had on the import supply curve, then the ability of the 
Commission to carry out the proposed analysis would only 
be limited by the quality of the data, the attention and time 
given the matter, and the power of the available statistical 
and econometric techniques.2I2 
Although it may be argued that the Commission can, . 
and perhaps should, in each case estimate the shift in the ' 
import supply curve, if the Commission is unwilling or un-
able to make this estimate itself, it should use the Commerce 
Department's margin calculations as an estimate of this shift. 
Critics of the Commission's use of margins argue, inter alia, 
that the Commission should not consider margins at all since 
the Commerce Department's calculations are wrong. These 
critics argue that the Commission should instead consider 
whether the imports and not the unfair trade practice has in-
jured the domestic industry.213 Such an argument implicitly 
assumes that there would be no imports but for the unfair 
trade practice. However, estimating the shift of the import 
210. S. REP. No. 2326, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 3900, 3901; H.R. REP. No. 2453, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1 (1954). 
211. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167la(d), 1673a(d) (1982). 
212. The argument that the Commission should look beyond Com-
merce's margins and estimate the impact of the unfair practice on the im-
port supply curve might be stronger for antidumping duty investigations 
than for countervailing duty investigations. The biases in Commerce's 
dumping margins result from Commerce's method of calculating the mar-
gins, whereas the biases in Commerce's subsidy margins result from the 
method intended by Congress. 
213. E.g., Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and 
Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 28-29, 8 
I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1786-87 (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (final); Easton & 
Perry, supra note 112, at 39-47. 
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supply curve according to the Commerce Department's mar-
gins would be more accurate than simply assuming that but 
for the unfair trade practice there would have been no im-
ports. Consequently, because the Commission should assess 
the impact of the unfair practice as best it can, given the con-
straints it faces, the Commission, if it is unwilling or unable 
to estimate the effect that the unfair practice has had on the 
import supply curve, should use the Commerce Depart-
ment's calculations of margins as an estimate of this shift. 
VIII. CoNcLUSION 
The antidumping and countervailing duty laws are 
aimed at two practices that Congress believes can injure do-
mestic producers: dumping by foreign companies of mer-
chandise in the United States and subsidies provided by for-
eign governments to producers that export merchandise to 
the United States.214 In enacting the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws, Congress walked a narrow path between 
the interests of consumers, importers, and foreign producers 
on the one hand and domestic producers on the other hand. 
Congress neither chose to allow unrestricted importation of 
dumped and subsidized goods, nor did it choose to exclude 
all dumped and subsidized goods from the United States. 
Instead, Congress attempted to tailor a remedy to fit a defi-
nite perceived evil.215 In carrying out the congressional di-
rective to grant relief to domestic producers who are so in-
jured, the Commission should determine whether the unfair 
practice has injured the domestic industry. In order to pro-
tect domestic producers from the effects of dumping and 
subsidization as Congress intended, it is unnecessary for the 
Commission to consider the full impact of the unfairly traded 
imports, yet alone the full impact of fairly and unfairly traded 
imports together. On the other hand, by requiring that the 
domestic industry be in an absolute state of injury, the Com-
mission has added a requirement for relief that is not in the 
214. SeeS. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 37, reprinted in 1979 U.S. 
CoDE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 423. 
215. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 46 (1979) ("[Title VII) 
is a remedy targeted at a specific type of injury caused by unfair import 
competition, and the Committee expects it to be administered in that con-
text."). 
116 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 22:37 
statute and that is inconsistent with the statute's purpose of 
protecting competing domestic industries from the adverse 
effects of dumping and subsidies. 
Furthermore, in order to grant relief to domestic indus-
tries that are injured by reason of dumped and subsidized 
imports (and only to such industries), the Commission must 
find a causal connection. Whatever causal factor the Com-
mission uses when it makes its statutory determination, 
either the imports or the unfair practice, and regardless of 
whether the Commission also uses an absolute standard of 
injury, a causal connection must exist between the causal fac-
tor and the condition of the domestic industry. Causation is 
not a matter of statutory interpretation, as are the decisions 
whether or not to bifurcate the determination and what 
cause to consider, but is a matter of economics.216 The law 
requires causation, and this requires an economic analysis-
an analysis that the Commission has traditionally refused to 
applr and that its reviewing courts have generally failed to 
reqmre. 
216. Questions of interpretation involving causation still remain. There 
are several, such as how much injury is required, who has the burden of 
proof, and how the Commission should measure injury. See, e.g., supra 
notes 112-14 7 and accompanying text (argument that the unfair practice is 
the appropriate causal factor). The point is that once these and any other 
questions of interpretation are resolved, there remains a core economic 
question: is the Commission sufficiently sure that the appropriate causal 
factor has had a substantial enough adverse effect on the relevant parties? 
